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THE INFLUENCE OF EXILE 
SARA K. RANKIN* 
Belonging is a fundamental human need, but human instincts are 
Janus-faced and equally strong is the drive to exclude.  This exclu-
sive impulse, which this Article calls “the influence of exile,” 
reaches beyond interpersonal dynamics when empowered groups 
use laws and policies to restrict marginalized groups’ access to 
public space.  Jim Crow, Anti-Okie, and Sundown Town laws are 
among many notorious examples.  But the influence of exile perse-
veres today: it has found a new incarnation in the stigmatization 
and spatial regulation of visible poverty, as laws that criminalize 
and eject visibly poor people from public space proliferate across 
the nation.  These laws reify popular attitudes toward visible pov-
erty, harming not only the visibly poor but also society as a whole.  
This Article seeks to expose and explain how the influence of exile 
operates; in doing so, it argues against the use of the criminal jus-
tice system as a response to visible poverty.  In its place, this Arti-
cle argues for more effective and efficient responses that take as 
their starting point an individual right to exist in public space, 
which for many visibly poor people is tantamount to a right to exist 
at all. 
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INTRODUCTION 
True compassion is more than flinging a coin to a beggar.  It comes 
to see that an edifice which produces beggars needs restructuring.1 
Concepts of inclusion and exile—that is, whether one earns permission 
to participate as a recognized part of society or should be distanced from it—
are at the core of human thought and motivation.2  The exclusive side of this 
pervasive phenomenon, which this Article calls “the influence of exile,” of-
ten drives the regulation and restriction of the rights of the most vulnerable 
members of society.3  However, legal discourse and decisionmaking do not 
                                                          
 1.  Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at Manhattan’s Riverside Church: Beyond Vietnam—A 
Time to Break Silence (Apr. 4, 1967) (a year to the day before he was assassinated).  
 2.  See Naomi I. Eisenberger et al., Does Rejection Hurt?  An fMRI Study of Social Exclusion, 
302 SCI. 290 (2003) (examining the painfulness of ostracism); Lisa Zadro et al., How Low Can You 
Go?  Ostracism by a Computer is Sufficient to Lower Self-Reported Levels of Belonging, Control, 
Self-Esteem, and Meaningful Existence, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 560, 567 (2004) (con-
cluding people are negatively impacted by rejection even if they know their exclusion comes from 
a random computerized algorithm); Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: 
Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
497, 497–529 (1995) (observing that a sense of belonging is a fundamental human need). 
 3.  Public opinion has been shown to influence both legislative policymaking and judicial de-
cisionmaking.  See Paul Burnstein, The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and 
an Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 29 (2003) (discussing the relationship between public opinion and 
policymaking); Hans Kelsen, On the Basis of Legal Validity, 26 AM. J. JURIS. 178 (1981) (observing 
that criminal laws are primarily a codification of social norms and are thus justified by reference to 
common social beliefs); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal 
Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169 (1996) 
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sufficiently account for it.  The human drive to exile is perhaps most clearly 
expressed when empowered groups restrict access to public space through 
legal4 or extra-legal5 means.  American history shows a persistent commit-
ment to exiling “undesirable” people from public space: Jim Crow, Anti-
Okie, and Sundown Town laws are among many notorious examples.6 
Another increasingly popular and deleterious manifestation of the urge 
to exile persists today: the proliferation of laws and policies that effectively 
banish visibly poor people from urban centers.7  For purposes of this Article, 
the term “visibly poor” and related iterations encompass individuals currently 
experiencing homelessness, but also include individuals experiencing pov-
erty in combination with housing instability, mental illness, or other psycho-
logical or socioeconomic challenges that deprive them of reasonable alterna-
tives to spending all or the majority of their time in public.8  Similarly, the 
hallmark of homelessness is a lack of private seclusion, so people experienc-
ing homelessness endure conditions of persistent, nearly inescapable visibil-
ity.9  As explained below, evidence of human struggle or desperation com-
monly provokes fear, annoyance, disgust, or anger from those who witness 
it.10  Thus, people experiencing homelessness and visibly poor people are 
                                                          
(establishing the influence of public opinion on Supreme Court jurisprudence).  Public opinion also 
influences the enactment of laws that impact commonly marginalized and stigmatized groups such 
as racial minorities, immigrants, members of the LGBTQ community, and homeless individuals.  
See David Leonhardt & Alicia Parlapiano, Why Gun Control and Abortion Are Different from Gay 
Marriage,  N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (June 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/up-
shot/why-gun-control-and-abortion-are-different-from-gay-marriage.html?_r=0 (synthesizing Pew 
Research Center and Gallup poll data on changes over time regarding social views of equality re-
lating to various marginalized groups and concluding “public opinion and legal changes fed on each 
other”); Javier Ortiz & Matthew Dick, SEATTLE UNIV. HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, 
The Wrong Side of History: A Comparison of Modern and Historical Criminalization Laws (Sara 
K. Rankin ed., 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602533 (reviewing historical and contemporary ef-
forts to purge marginalized groups from public space, including correlations between legal devel-
opments and public opinion); see also Marie-Eve Sylvestre & Céline Bellot, Challenging Discrim-
inatory and Punitive Responses to Homelessness in Canada, in ADVANCING SOCIAL RIGHTS IN 
CANADA (Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter eds., 2014) (observing that “punitive responses to home-
lessness were largely based on negative stereotyping, prejudices, and discrimination”).  The rela-
tionship between popular societal attitudes and perceptions, and the development of laws and poli-
cies is also implicated in discussions of institutional discrimination.  See, e.g., EDWARD ROYCE, 
POVERTY & POWER: THE PROBLEM OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY 17 (2009) (discussing how dis-
crimination is largely a structural problem since “these obstacles . . . originate from the combined 
workings of the economic, political, cultural, and social systems”). 
 4.  Legal means may include contemporary homeless criminalization laws or historical exclu-
sion laws.  See infra Part III.  
 5.  Examples of extra-legal means include the government-sponsored provision of one-way 
bus tickets to take homeless people out of town or the use of “hostile architecture.”  See infra Part 
III.C. 
 6.  Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3. 
 7.  See infra note 17. 
 8.  See, e.g., Joel Blau, The Visible Poor: Homelessness in the United States (1993).   
 9.  See generally id. 
 10.  See Part I.A–C; Part IV. 
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particularly vulnerable to the influence of exile precisely because of their vis-
ibility and sustained occupation of public space.11  Such battles for tactical 
control of public space are fueled by the influence of exile—deeply ingrained 
class and status distinctions—that can inconspicuously, even unconsciously 
undermine the constitutional, civil, and human rights of visibly poor people. 
Despite America’s disturbing heritage of exiling marginalized groups 
from public space, contemporary legal discourse largely ignores such analo-
gies when laws and policies similarly marginalize poor or homeless people.  
This Article contends that discrimination, stereotypes, and bias fuel the en-
actment and enforcement of laws and policies that regulate and restrict visi-
bly poor people from public space; however, these laws are not commonly 
understood as discriminatory.  Instead, legal and popular discourse often le-
gitimates these laws through narratives that blame poor people for their pov-
erty, associate them with criminality, or accept as unassailable the purported 
interests of public safety or public health.  A better understanding of the in-
fluence of exile should prompt a re-examination of such laws and policies 
that not only push poor people to the literal fringes of society, but also con-
demn them to stay there. 
This Article is organized in four parts.  Part I introduces the influence 
of exile in the context of societal perceptions of the visibly poor.  This Section 
surveys sociological and psychological studies that clearly establish the hu-
man instincts to organize, include, and exclude each other, especially around 
perceived status and class lines.12  This Section suggests that common stere-
otypes and prejudices can influence societal judgments regarding one’s wor-
thiness13 and, in turn, these perceptions not only affect the restrictions of 
rights and resources of poor people in general but visibly poor people in par-
ticular.14 
Part II examines interdisciplinary definitions and perceptions of public 
space as a stage for the influence of exile.  This Section examines questions 
                                                          
 11.  Joel Blau explains: 
[P]ublic displays of poverty are somehow improper.  Since only the most desperate peo-
ple exhibit their poverty, the slightest glimpse of their desperation makes others feel un-
easy.  Witnesses to homelessness then become like the unwilling spectators of an intimate 
domestic quarrel.  They know these things occur, but firmly believe they should be kept 
private if at all possible.  
BLAU, supra note 8, at 4.   
 12.  See generally SUSAN T. FISKE, ENVY UP, SCORN DOWN: HOW STATUS DIVIDES US (2011) 
(discussing a wide range of scholarship and studies). 
 13.  See generally id.; see also Mina Cikara et al., On the Wrong Side of the Trolley Track: 
Neural Correlates of Relative Social Valuation, 5 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 
404 (2010) (discussing the types of harm that come from economically well-off people who deter-
mine that a homeless person’s life is not worth as much as a higher class person’s life).   
 14.  Burnstein, supra note 3; Carolyn J. Tompsett et al., Homelessness in the United States: 
Assessing Changes in Prevalence and Public Opinion, 1993–2001, 37 AM. J. COMMUNITY 
PSYCHOL. 47 (2006) (explaining that the views of domiciled individuals influence social and legal 
policy). 
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such as what is public space?  Who should have access?  Who gets to decide 
the scope and terms of access?  What do these inquiries mean for democratic 
principles, diversity, tolerance, and social justice?  These inquiries reveal dis-
quieting tensions in American constructions and valuations of public space. 
Part III connects our societal attitudes toward the poor with contests 
over public space, surveying the increasing prevalence and popularity of laws 
that regulate the presence of poor people in public space.  These spatial-hier-
archical responses to visible poverty not only raise legal and policy con-
cerns,15 but they have been shown to be ineffective and more expensive than 
the provision of non-punitive alternatives, such as social services and afford-
able housing.16  Still, many jurisdictions continue to favor laws and policies 
of exclusion to mitigate visible evidence of poverty, such as the removal of 
homeless people from public space through the use of “move along” warn-
ings, civil infractions, or incarceration.17 
Part IV contends that the influence of exile must be better understood 
and confronted as a matter of public awareness, and particularly as a matter 
of law and policy.  Many non-legal disciplines confront the influence of exile, 
but legal discourse, by contrast, fails to adequately account for its impact on 
the rights of visibly poor people.  The influence of exile on the regulation of 
public space has profoundly negative impacts, not only on the visibly poor 
but also on society as a whole.  This Section argues for the reconceptualiza-
tion of the presence and integration of homeless and visibly poor people as 
vital to American democratic principles and the revitalization of truly public 
space. 
I.  THE INFLUENCE OF EXILE: HOW WE PERCEIVE THE VISIBLY POOR 
Status is everywhere . . . .  This process is so basic that we auto-
matically judge the dominance of another individual in a fraction 
of a second, using certain cues, such as physical strength. . . .  All 
                                                          
 15.  See NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES (2014), http://nlchp.org/docu-
ments/No_Safe_Place [hereinafter NAT’L LAW CTR.]; Justin Olson & Scott MacDonald, SEATTLE 
UNIV. HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, Washington’s War on the Visibly Poor: A Survey 
of Criminalizing Ordinances & Their Enforcement (Sara K. Rankin ed., 2015), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2602318; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962) (holding that a state cannot 
punish a person for his or her status).  Following Robinson, the Court invalidated a Texas law crim-
inalizing homosexual acts through anti-sodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 16.  NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15; Josh Howard & David Tran, SEATTLE UNIV. HOMELESS 
RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, At What Cost: The Minimum Cost of Criminalizing Homelessness in 
Seattle & Spokane (Sara K. Rankin ed. 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602530. 
 17.  See, e.g., NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15; Olson & MacDonald, supra note 15; MARINA 
FISHER ET AL., UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY SCHOOL OF LAW POLICY ADVOCACY CLINIC, 
CALIFORNIA’S NEW VAGRANCY LAWS: THE GROWING ENACTMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-
HOMELESS LAWS IN THE GOLDEN STATE (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2558944.  
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known organizations gravitate toward status and power hierar-
chies because this structure makes them run more smoothly.  At the 
macro level, human societies stratify social groups by dominance 
hierarchies, especially social class.18 
Common perceptions of poor people can fuel their marginalization.  
Poverty is relative; in America, income inequality shapes American society 
in significant ways.  Different measures of wealth or poverty correlate to dif-
ferent outcomes concerning health,19 housing,20 transportation,21 education,22 
water,23 and of course, the law.24  Differential allocations of rights and re-
sources are no accident.  Empowered groups, which control access to politi-
cal and financial resources, also control decisions about the allocation of 
                                                          
 18.  FISKE, supra note 12, at 26. 
 19.  See, e.g., Annie Lowery, Income Gap, Meet the Longevity Gap, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/business/income-gap-meet-the-longevity-gap.html 
(discussing the relationship between income disparity and health); Brenda Major & Laurie O’Brien, 
The Social Psychology of Stigma, 56 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 393 (2005) (observing the relationship 
between social belonging and health); Neil Schneiderman et al., Stress and Health: Psychological, 
Behavioral, and Biological Determinants, 1 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 607 (2005) (observing 
the relationship between social belonging, psychosocial stressors, and health).   
 20.  See, e.g., Rajini Vaidyanathan, Why Don’t Black and White Americans Live Together?, 
BBC NEWS (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-35255835 (discussing 
trends in housing segregation and noting that across the nation, “people of other races simply don’t 
mix, not through choice but circumstance.  And if there’s no interaction between races, it’s harder 
for conversations on how to solve race problems to even begin.”); William H. Frey, Census Shows 
Modest Declines in Black-White Segregation, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Dec. 8, 2015, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/the-avenue/posts/2015/12/08-census-black-white-segregation-
frey (observing that even modest declines in segregation “are still high measures—more than half 
of blacks would need to move to achieve complete integration”).   
 21.  See, e.g., Mike Maciag, Public Transportation’s Demographic Divide, GOVERNING: THE 
STATES AND LOCALITIES (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infra-
structure/gov-public-transportation-riders-demographic-divide-for-cities.html; Kirk Johnson, Tar-
geting Inequality, This Time on Public Transit, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.ny-
times.com/2015/03/01/us/targeting-inequality-this-time-on-public-transit.html?_r=0. 
 22.  See, e.g., NEIGHBORHOOD AND LIFE CHANCES: HOW PLACE MATTERS IN MODERN 
AMERICA (Harriet Newburger et al. eds., 2011) (examining the impact of poverty and neighborhood 
on a variety of measures, including educational attainment and equal opportunity).  
 23.  Stephanie Pincetl & Terri S. Hogue, California’s New Normal? Recurring Drought: Ad-
dressing Winners and Losers, 20 LOC. ENV’T 850 (2015), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2015.1042778 (highlighting the widening gap of inequality be-
tween the wealthy and the poor of California, specifically in relation to the State’s current drought). 
 24.  For example, poor people struggle with access to justice issues.  See, e.g., Deborah L. 
Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (2001) (examining the access to justice crisis).  
Poverty is also likely to result in unequal treatment under the law when compared to legal outcomes 
for more affluent defendants.  See, e.g., GLENN GREENWALD, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR 
SOME: HOW THE LAW IS USED TO DESTROY EQUALITY AND PROTECT THE POWERFUL 269 (2011) 
(“The greater the disparities in wealth and power become, the more unequal the law becomes—and 
the more unequal the law is, the more opportunities it creates for the wealthy and powerful to rein-
force their advantages.”); MATT TAIBBI, THE DIVIDE: AMERICAN INJUSTICE IN THE AGE OF THE 
WEALTH GAP (2014) (exploring how “basic rights are now determined by our wealth or poverty”).   
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rights and resources—even though these decisions clearly impact disempow-
ered groups as well.25  Naturally, empowered groups cannot be assumed to 
be disinterested in such decisions.26  Moreover, empowered groups’ percep-
tions of the social worth of disempowered groups influence these decisions.27  
The relationship between power and rights informs many socio-political the-
ories, which maintain that empowered groups consciously or unconsciously 
use such power to reproduce class relations and hierarchies.28  Simply put, 
                                                          
 25.  See, e.g., Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebi-
scites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 581 (1994) (discussing the danger of a tyrannical majority); Julian 
N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1506, 1513–31 (1990) (discuss-
ing the popular belief that direct democracy is an authoritative expression of majority will and iden-
tifying significant problems associated with this conception); Stephen R. Munzer, Ellickson on 
“Chronic Misconduct” in Urban Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Bench Squatters, and Day Laborers, 32 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 18–20 (1997) (discussing the ways the views and interests of the visible 
poor are discounted in societal calculations of maximizing “public welfare”).   
 26.  See generally JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT (1992) (examining 
how institutional rules reflect the self-interested motivations of individuals, who perpetuate institu-
tional structures that best serve their strategic interests).  Many economic theories paint a stark por-
trait of self-interest, suggesting that people make decisions in order to maximize their wealth and 
other material goals.  See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, 
and Cooperation, 114 Q. J. ECON. 817, 817 (1999); Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A 
Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 247 (1980) (“Partly because there is 
no common currency in which to compare happiness, sharing, and protection of rights, it is unclear 
how to make the necessary trade-offs among these things in the design of a social system. Wealth 
maximization makes the trade-offs automatically.”); see also Sanford Schram & Joe Soss, Demon-
izing the Poor, JACOBIN (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/09/welfare-republi-
cans-sam-brownback-race-corporations/ (“Harsh restrictions on welfare don’t limit fraud and abuse. 
They advance the interests of the rich and powerful.”).  Of course, these assumptions are often 
contradicted by examples where people prioritize social goals over economic self-interest.  See, e.g., 
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 842–44, 854–56 (2009) (discussing 
examples in the context of property law).  Because disempowered people are, by definition, not an 
actively engaged political majority, their preferences—whether driven by self-interest or not—do 
not control the allocation of rights and resources.  Patrick Flavin, Income Inequality and Policy 
Representation in the American States, 40 AM. POL. RES. 29, 29 (2012) (concluding that lower 
income individuals “receive little substantive political representation (compared to more affluent 
citizens)”).   
 27.  The allocation of resources based on social worth is often studied and critiqued in the con-
text of economics and ethics.  See, e.g., Advanced Application of Ethics: Types of Resource Alloca-
tion, UNIV. OF ILL. AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN: ENGINEERING ETHICS, http://www.scs.illi-
nois.edu/~eseebauer/ethics/Advanced/Allocation.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2016); see also CRIME, 
DISORDER AND COMMUNITY SAFETY: A NEW AGENDA? (Roger Matthews & John Pitts eds., 2001).  
Relatedly, social worth is also frequently examined under the rubric of distributive justice in phi-
losophy and social sciences.  See Linda J. Skitka & Faye J. Crosby, Trends in the Social Psycho-
logical Study of Justice, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV., 282, 282–85 (2003).  Distributive 
justice may occur when individuals “get what they deserve,” a calculation based in part on norms 
and an individual’s perceived worthiness according to those norms.  See, e.g., Morton Deutsch, 
Equity, Equality, and Need: What Determines Which Value Will Be Used as the Basis of Distributive 
Justice?, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES 137 (1975).  As discussed infra, Part II, legal interpretations of social 
worth—especially the allocations of rights relating to social worth—often manifest in doctrines of 
property and constitutional law.  
 28.  For more on the systemic reproduction of hierarchies, see, for example, PAULA S. 
ROTHENBERG, RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN THE UNITED STATES 593 (2007) (noting “the stere-
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the powerful generally stay powerful, the rich stay rich, and the poor stay 
poor.29 
A.  Social Worthiness & Socio-Spatial Distance 
The engine of this hierarchical system may be human psychology, plain 
and simple.  People perceive and organize each other through the formation 
of powerful “in-groups” and marginalized “out-groups.”  Powerful in-group 
members may exclude people as “others” having undesirable attributes, thus 
warranting their rejection from the accepted core of the in-group and their 
placement on the margins.30  Commonly recognized out-groups include racial 
or ethnic minorities,31 LGBTQ individuals,32 people with physical or mental 
disabilities,33 as well as homeless and visibly poor people.34 
These sorts of judgments demonstrate “social distancing,” a phenome-
non well explained in social psychology.  Social distancing examines “the 
ways in which individual preferences, based in a person’s membership of 
specific social in-groups, influence social relations with people from other 
out-groups.  These judgments are often measured along a continuum with 
                                                          
otypes and values transmitted through education and the media have played a critical role in perpet-
uating racism, sexism, hetero-sexism, and class privilege even at those times when the law has been 
used as a vehicle to fight discrimination rather than maintain it”).  Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and 
Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 138 (2013) (arguing 
that “racial wealth and housing disparities are dramatic and are probably best explained as a result 
of systemic racial discrimination and related preferences”).  For more on unconscious aspects of 
structural discrimination, see Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a 
New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723 (2000) (examining “organizational 
activity that systematically harms minority groups even though the decision-making individuals 
lack any conscious discriminatory intent”).  
 29.  Income inequality is particularly pronounced along racial lines.  Rakesh Kochhar & Rich-
ard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-
wealth-gaps-great-recession/ (documenting significant disparities in median household net worth 
by race).  Such structural inequalities relentlessly persist.  See Ezra Rosser, supra note 28, at 134 
(discussing the work of Professor Daria Roithmayr and others as “show[ing] how racial advantage 
and disadvantage need not be tied to intentional discrimination; instead such advantages and disad-
vantages can remain stable because the effects of prior discrimination and related early advantages 
get locked into place”).  
 30.  See, e.g., FISKE, supra note 12, at 26; Bruce G. Link & Jo C. Phelan, Conceptualizing 
Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 363 (2001). 
 31.  See, e.g., SUSAN WELCH ET AL., RACE AND PLACE: RACE RELATIONS IN AN AMERICAN 
CITY (2001). 
 32.  See Gregory M. Herek & John P. Capitanio, “Some of My Best Friends”: Intergroup Con-
tact, Concealable Stigma, and Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward Gay Men and Lesbians, 22 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 412 (1996). 
 33.  Elaine Makas, Getting in Touch: The Relationship Between Contact with and Attitudes 
Toward People with Disabilities, in PERSPECTIVES ON DISABILITY 121 (Mark Nagler ed., 1993). 
 34.  See, e.g., Barrett A. Lee et al., Revisiting the Contact Hypothesis: The Case of Public Ex-
posure to Homelessness, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 40 (2004).   
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nearness, intimacy, or familiarity at one end and farness, difference, and un-
familiarity at the other end.”35  Sociologist Georg Simmel famously advanced 
the concept of a “stranger” as an archetype of social distancing: the stranger 
often is perceived to transgress social norms and thus lives at the fringes of 
society, wavering in and out of visibility at the periphery.36  Even when 
strangers are physically near, they are perceived as “far.”37  In this respect, 
social distancing is both a psychological and hierarchical act of organization, 
reinforcing one’s perceptions of in-group and out-group membership.  But 
social distancing also reinforces the likelihood that one might form basic 
emotional and moral associations, such as empathy, anger, disgust, or pity 
for another based on perceived group membership.38  Higher degrees of so-
cial distance facilitate negative associations.39 
Social distancing is not only a psychological phenomenon; it can also 
manifest as a physical one.  Social distancing is associated with increased 
                                                          
 35.  Darrin Hodgetts et al., ‘Near and Far:’ Social Distancing in Domiciled Characterisations 
of Homeless People, 48 URB. STUD. 1739, 1740 (2011).  Professor Paul Gorski translates years of 
considerable research about stereotyping people in poverty:  
Stereotypes grow, as well, from how we’re socialized.  They are the result of what we 
are taught to think about poor people, for instance, even if we are poor, through celebra-
tions of “meritocracy” or by watching a parent lock the car doors when driving through 
certain parts of town.  They grow, as well, from a desire to find self-meaning by distin-
guishing between social and cultural groups with which we do and do not identify. 
PAUL GORSKI, REACHING AND TEACHING STUDENTS IN POVERTY: STRATEGIES FOR ERASING THE 
OPPORTUNITY GAP 57 (2013). 
 36.  Georg Simmel, The Sociological Significance of the “Stranger”, in INTRODUCTION TO THE 
SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY 322, 322–26 (R. Park & E. Burgess eds., 1921).  For more on Simmel’s 
theories of social distancing, see GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL (Kurt H. 
Wolff ed., trans.,1950).   
 37.  See, e.g., Donald Levine et al., Simmel’s Influence on American Sociology I, 81 AM. J. 
SOC. 813 (1976) (explaining the tension between the near and far embodied in strangers).  
 38.  FISKE, supra note 12, at 26 (discussing the association of these reactions based on percep-
tions of social worth).  Stigma literature closely examines how in-groups assign stigma, a sort of 
“spoiled identity that encourages their devaluation and rejection by ‘normal’ others.”  Lee et al., 
supra note 34, at 42.   
 39.  As Princeton psychologist Susan Fiske explains: “Distance has the effect of belittling peo-
ple, making them appear smaller.  Hence, keeping our distance should make it easier for us to look 
down on other people.  Indeed, it is easier to dehumanize someone at a distance.  Scorn looks down 
and distances.”  FISKE, supra note 12, at 51 (footnote omitted).   
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spatial distancing,40 such as the evolution of racially segregated neighbor-
hoods and schools.41  Naturally, spatial distance depresses opportunities for 
interaction among groups.  Indeed, physical segregation may be either an un-
intended consequence or an explicit motivation associated with social dis-
tancing.42 
Although social distancing may be a hard-wired human phenomenon, it 
not only invites discrimination and compromise of the rights of perceived 
                                                          
 40.  Interdisciplinary scholarship in law and geography presumes a reciprocal relationship be-
tween the law and the spatial conception of social life.  See, e.g., Austin Sarat et al., Where (or 
What) Is the Place of Law? An Introduction, in THE PLACE OF LAW 1, 1–20 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 
2003).  For an excellent legal-spatial analysis applied to law regulating the presence of homeless 
people in Seattle, see KATHERINE BECKETT & STEVE HERBERT, BANISHED: THE NEW SOCIAL 
CONTROL IN URBAN AMERICA (2010).  Other scholars have documented the international applica-
tion of spatial laws to marginalized groups by class and social status.  See, e.g., Marie-Eve Sylvestre, 
Disorder and Public Spaces in Montreal: Repression (and Resistance) Through Law, Politics, and 
Police Discretion, 31 URB. GEOGRAPHY 803, 803 (2010) (surveying studies from the United States, 
Canada, Western Europe, and South America).  Stand your ground laws, frequently infused with 
debates about racial discrimination, are one of many potential sites of inquiry about how proximity 
in physical space, combined with bias, can influence discretionary decisions with potentially dev-
astating consequences.  See Christine Catalfamo, Stand Your Ground: Florida’s Castle Doctrine 
for the Twenty-First Century, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 504, 536–37 (2007) (noting that Mi-
ami’s urbanization has exposed individuals to violence at a much closer proximity than when living 
situations were more rural).   
 41.  History is replete with examples of exclusionary laws that minimize the presence of “un-
desirable people” in public space.  See, e.g., Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3.  For more on the relation-
ship between discrimination and current trends in racial segregation, see, for example, PAUL 
JARGOWSKY, ARCHITECTURE OF SEGREGATION: CIVIL UNREST, THE CONCENTRATION OF 
POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2015) (noting that discriminatory housing, zoning, and other policy 
choices are driving a dramatic increase in racialized poverty and segregation across the U.S.); 
DAVID SANCHEZ ET AL., AN OPPORTUNITY AGENDA FOR RENTERS: THE CASE FOR 
SIMULTANEOUS INVESTMENTS IN RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY AND LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 
(2015) (finding the “lack of available affordable housing and deeply rooted patterns of residential 
segregation have created a situation in which where people live depends in large part on their in-
come, race, and ethnicity”); Matthew Hall et al., Neighborhood Foreclosures, Racial/Ethnic Tran-
sitions, and Residential Segregation, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 526, 527 (2015) (observing that racialized 
segregation “fueled” the foreclosure crisis, which in turn, “may have significantly disrupted trajec-
tories toward residential integration”); Gary Orfield et al., E Pluribus . . . Separation: Deepening 
Double Segregation for More Students, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT (Sept. 2012), http://civilright-
sproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/mlk-national/e-pluribus sepa-
ration-deepening-double-segregation-for-more-students/orfield_epluribus_revised_ om-
plete_2012.pdf (finding segregation has “increased dramatically” for Latino students and is a 
persistent problem of “double segregation” by race and poverty for African-American students).   
 42.  Jim Crow era segregationists were arguably transparent about the goal of physically sepa-
rating the races.  Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3, at 6–8.  But the oppressive impacts of systemic dis-
crimination are not always conscious choices; this observation is well-developed in literature con-
cerning unconscious bias.  See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 
(2005); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decision-making, and Misre-
membering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 359 (2007).  The law accommodates the influence of unconscious 
bias in race cases by allowing proof of intentional discrimination or discriminatory impact.  See, 
e.g., Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2525 (2015) (holding that, under the Fair Housing Act, a plaintiff may establish disparate-impact 
liability based on evidence of disproportionate impact instead of proof of intentional discrimina-
tion). 
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out-groups, but it also comes at a significant cost to the personal growth and 
understanding of in-group members.  Socio-spatial distancing decreases in-
teraction and integration among groups.  However, contact theory shows that 
contact between in-group and out-group members generally improves “the 
attitudes of the former toward the latter by replacing in-group ignorance with 
first-hand knowledge that disconfirms stereotypes.”43  In other words, social-
spatial segregation further entrenches stereotyping, misunderstanding, and 
the stigmatization of marginalized groups.44  Such self-perpetuating conse-
quences of socio-spatial distancing are troubling. 
B.  The Special Stigma of Poverty 
Socio-spatial instincts have particular significance when applied to so-
cietal perceptions of poor people.  Of all commonly identified out-groups, 
visibly poor and homeless people may be at the bottom of the chain.  Social 
neuroscientists confirm that today, society tends to regard homeless and vis-
ibly poor people with disgust and rejection at higher rates than people of any 
other perceived status.45  Other studies consistently suggest that of all mar-
ginalized groups, homeless and visibly poor people are the most severely and 
persistently stigmatized.46 
                                                          
 43.  Lee et al., supra note 34, at 40; see also Vaidyanathan, supra note 20 (discussing trends in 
racial segregation). 
 44.  For more on the process of stigmatization, see Link & Phelan, supra note 30; see also 
Major & O’Brien, supra note 19.  
 45.  See FISKE, supra note 12, at 131 (noting that “in the United States, by far the most extreme 
out-group is homeless people, but drug addicts, welfare recipients, and immigrants, especially un-
documented ones, are also among society’s default bad guys”); see also SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE: 
TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE SOCIAL MIND 124 (Alexander Todorov 
et al. eds., 2011) (describing how study participants “dehumanized [homeless people] as ill-inten-
tioned, inept, unfamiliar, dissimilar, strange, and not uniquely human or quite typically human”); 
Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: Neuroimaging Responses 
to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847, 848 (2006) (describing study results placing home-
less people in the “lowest” category lacking warmth and competence, which “elicit the worst kind 
of prejudice—disgust and contempt—based on perceived moral violations and subsequent negative 
outcomes that these groups allegedly caused themselves”); Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, So-
cial Groups That Elicit Disgust Are Differentially Processed in mPFC, 2 SOC. COGNITIVE & 
AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 45 (2007) (finding study participants dehumanize homeless people as 
stimuli that elicit “disgust”).  Some scholars attribute these perceptions to negative stereotyping, 
prejudices, and discrimination, often associated with moral judgments and assumptions that visibly 
poor people are to blame for their condition.  See, e.g., BLAU, supra note 8; see also Sylvestre & 
Bellot, supra note 3.  Sylvestre and Bellot describe common views of homeless people as “inferior, 
lazy, and dishonest individuals (the ‘moral deprivation’ discourse), blamed for their own misfor-
tunes (the ‘choice’ discourse), and are treated as criminals or potential serious offenders needing to 
be repressed and confined rather than as equal citizens worthy of respect and consideration (the 
‘criminality discourse’).”  Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 3, at 2.   
 46.  See, e.g., FISKE, supra note 12 (reviewing various studies and concluding that societal dis-
dain for the homeless and visibly poor is the most severe); see also Leon Anderson, David A. Snow 
& Daniel Cress, Negotiating the Public Realm: Stigma Management and Collective Action Among 
the Homeless, in RESEARCH IN COMMUNITY SOCIOLOGY: THE COMMUNITY OF THE STREETS 121 
(Dan A. Chekki et al. eds., 1994) (documenting that homeless or visibly poor people are commonly 
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But don’t just take the word of social scientists.  America’s deep disdain 
for poor people is commonly acknowledged in popular media as well.  Cele-
brated Rolling Stone journalist and best-selling author of The Divide: Amer-
ican Injustice in the Age of the Wealth Gap, Matt Taibbi, recently declared 
that Americans have “a profound hatred of the weak and the poor.”47  Lin-
guist and philosopher Noam Chomsky apparently agrees, describing a “class 
war” in a recent article, partly titled, America Hates Its Poor.48  Television 
commentators frequently suggest that shaming and stigmatizing poverty is 
vital to the national economy.49  Television producers commonly gamble on 
                                                          
not perceived as human beings); Jo Phelan et al., The Stigma of Homelessness: The Impact of the 
Label “Homeless” on Attitudes Toward Poor Persons, 60 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 323, 334 (1997) (con-
cluding that “homelessness is stigmatized more severely than poverty and, generally, more severely 
than mental illness”).  Of course, the intersectionality between homelessness and other marginalized 
groups complicates the question of which perceived traits or out-group membership might trigger 
negative associations of in-group members.  For more on the intersectionality of homelessness and 
other commonly stigmatized groups, see Kaya Lurie & Breanne Schuster, SEATTLE UNIV. 
HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, Discrimination at the Margins: The Intersectionality of 
Homelessness & Other Marginalized Groups (Sara K. Rankin ed., 2015), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2602532. 
 47.  Emily Tess Katz, Matt Taibbi: America Has a ‘Profound Hatred of the Weak and the 
Poor’, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 16, 2014, 2:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2014/04/16/matt-taibbi-the-divide_n_5159626.html.  
 48.  Chris Steele, Noam Chomsky: America Hates Its Poor, SALON MEDIA GRP. (Dec. 1, 2013, 
7:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/12/01/noam_chomsky_america_hates_its_poor_ partner/. 
 49.  Examples abound, but Fox News provides a prolific showcase.  On a recent edition of Fox 
Business’s Varney & Co. at Night, Stuart Varney reflected on his earlier statement that “99.6% of 
[poor people] have a refrigerator.”  Varney opined, “[t]he image we have of poor people as starving 
and living in squalor really is not accurate.  Many of them have things, what they lack is the richness 
of spirit.”  Media Matters Staff, Fox’s Stuart Varney on the Poor: “Many of Them Have Things—
What They Lack Is the Richness of Spirit”, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Aug. 25, 2011, 9:56 PM), 
http://mediamatters.org/video/2011/08/25/foxs-stuart-varney-on-the-poor-many-of-them-
hav/138530.  On America’s Newsroom, Fox Business host Charles Payne alleged that federal ben-
efit programs trap people in poverty and complained that there wasn’t enough “stigma” directed at 
poor Americans for using food assistance programs: “I know there’s a big thing trying to de-stig-
matize food stamps, but the good part about the stigma is it actually does serve as an impetus to get 
people off of it. . . .  They’re trying to take that stigma away.”  Media Matters Staff, Fox’s Charles 
Payne Laments Lack of “Stigma” Surrounding Food Stamps, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Mar. 28, 
2013, 10:29 AM), http://mediamatters.org/video/2013/03/28/foxs-charles-payne-laments-lack-of-
stigma-surro/193311.  Similarly, in a recent segment of Fox News’ Happening Now, Fox Business 
co-contributor Charles Gasparino explained that he wished more stigma was attached to welfare.  
Craig Harrington, Fox’s Gasparino Calls Public Pensions “Ponzi Schemes,” Wishes More 
“Stigma” Was Attached to Welfare, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Aug. 21, 2014, 4:39 PM), 
http://mediamatters.org/blog/2014/08/21/foxs-gasparino-calls-public-pensions-ponzi-sche/200506. 
New York Post columnist Michael Goodwin recently lamented that “the sense of shame is gone” 
from enrolling in government anti-poverty programs.  See Noah Rothman, NY Post Columnist: 
‘Sense of Shame is Gone’ for Entitlement Recipients, MEDIATE, L.L.C. (May 21, 2012, 9:45 AM), 
http://www.mediaite.com/tv/ny-post-columnist-sense-of-shame-is-gone-for-entitlement-recipi-
ents/. 
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the popularity of so-called “poverty porn,” which entertains through the spec-
tacle of poor people enduring hardships, all for the viewing pleasure of the 
public.50 
Contemporary politics also demonstrate an appetite for stigmatizing the 
poor.51  Recently, an Oklahoman political party compared food stamp recip-
ients to wild animals.52  Maine placed a cap on the savings accounts of food 
stamp recipients, a move some criticized as discouraging poor people from 
saving money.53  Wisconsin recently passed a so-called “food nanny” bill,54 
prohibiting food stamp recipients from buying a long list of staple food items, 
including beans, spaghetti sauce, and nuts.55  Further, Wisconsin joined many 
other states in requiring applicants for most state benefits to submit to drug 
screening, despite strong evidence that welfare recipients have a lower posi-
tive test rate for illicit drug use than the general population.56  Several states 
                                                          
 50.  A recent but controversial and short-lived example was CBS’s The Briefcase.  See, e.g., 
Douglas Cobb, ‘The Briefcase’ Takes Poverty Porn to ‘Hunger Games’ Level, GUARDIAN LIBERTY 
VOICE (May 31, 2015), http://guardianlv.com/2015/05/the-briefcase-takes-poverty-porn-to-hunger-
games-level/; Dave Broome, Creator of ‘The Briefcase,’ Says Show Is Not ‘Poverty Porn’, 
HUFFINGTON POST, (June 25, 2015, 5:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/25/the-
briefcase_n_7666440.html.  
 51.  GREENWALD, supra note 24, at 14 (“It is now quite common for American political dis-
course to include arguments expressly justifying the elites’ legal impunity and openly calling for 
radically different treatment under the law for various classes of people based on their power, status, 
and wealth.”). 
 52.  The Facebook page on the “Oklahoma Republican Party” website, which has since been 
removed, criticized what it described as an increase in the distribution of food stamps, noting that 
“[m]eanwhile, the National Park Service . . . , asks us ‘Please Do Not Feed the Animals.’  Their 
stated reason for the policy is because ‘[t]he animals will grow dependent on handouts and will not 
learn to take care of themselves.’ . . .  Thus ends today’s lesson in irony.”  Steve Benen, State GOP 
Equates Food-Stamp Recipients, Wild Animals, MSNBC.COM (July 14, 2015, 7:14 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/state-gop-equates-food-stamp-recipients-wild-ani-
mals?cid=sm_fb_maddow. 
 53.  Roberto A. Ferdman, How Maine Will Punish the Poor for Trying to Save Money, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/how-maine-will-punish-the-poor-
for-trying-to-save-money/ar-AAeZLls?li=AAa0dzB&ocid=wispr.  Maine pursued these re-
strictions despite the fact that the state’s “poor timeliness” in processing food stamps applications 
prompted the United States Department of Agriculture to threaten the state with penalties.  Alan 
Pyke, Feds Threaten Maine with Big Fines over Food Stamps, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 16, 2015, 
9:19 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2015/12/16/3732595/maine-food-stamps-processing-
fine/.  
 54.  The bill became known as the “food nanny bill,” presumably for its paternalistic approach 
to managing the food purchases of the poor.  See “Food Nanny” Bill Comes up for Vote, 
WXERFM.COM (May 13, 2015, 8:17 AM), http://wxerfm.com/news/articles/2015/may/13/food-
nanny-bill-comes-up-for-vote/.  
 55.  Assemb. B. 117, 2015–2016 Leg., 102nd Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2015), http://docs.legis.wiscon-
sin.gov/2015/related/proposals/ab177. 
 56.  Bryce Covert, Wisconsin Begins Drug Testing for Unemployment and Food Stamp Appli-
cants, Which May Be Illegal, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 9, 2015, 10:59 AM), http://thinkpro-
gress.org/economy/2015/11/09/3720495/wisconsin-begin-drug-tests/; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 49.79 
(West 2015). 
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cap eligibility for welfare based on the number of people per family to dis-
courage poor women from having children, despite evidence that families 
receiving welfare are no larger than those in the general public and that such 
caps actually exacerbate poverty.57  Critics contend such regulations are ex-
pensive and ineffective and instead primarily serve to punish poor people for, 
well, being poor.58  Ultimately, such punitive constructions codify and legit-
imize the instinct to condemn people for their poverty. 
C.  Poverty and the Transmutation of Discrimination 
Given the disproportionate representation of other various marginalized 
groups within poor and homeless populations, the higher rate of negativity 
associated with poverty—as opposed to other commonly stigmatized traits—
is curious.  Studies show visible poverty elicits higher rates of disgust than 
nearly any other commonly marginalized trait, including racial or ethnic in-
dicia.59  But poverty is more likely to be associated with racial minorities, 
people with physical and mental disabilities, and single-female-headed fam-
ilies.60  Similarly, homeless populations are disproportionately comprised of 
these and other commonly marginalized groups.61  The special stigma re-
served for poor and homeless people, then, seems at odds with such evidence 
of intersectionality.  Why does viewing people through the lens of poverty 
trigger especially negative reactions? 
Perhaps this special stigma serves as a sort of release valve for the con-
temporary American conscience: as many forms of discrimination find less 
space in a normative framework, the stigmatization of poverty may present 
an attractive path of less resistance.62  National public opinion seems to ac-
cept the normative proposition that (at least overt) discrimination on the basis 
                                                          
 57.  See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.04 (West 1994); see also Bryce Covert, An 
‘Ugly Policy’ Systematically Devalues Poor Children.  One State Is Ready to Stop It., 
THINKPROGRESS (July 1, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/econ-
omy/2015/07/01/3675655/california-family-cap/. 
 58.  See, e.g., KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY (2011) (discussing the criminalization of welfare); Kaaryn Gus-
tafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2009) (discussing laws 
and policies that punish and marginalize poor people); JOE SOSS ET AL., DISCIPLINING THE POOR: 
NEOLIBERAL PATERNALISM AND THE PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE (2011) (cataloguing the sys-
temic oppression and regulation of the poor). 
 59.  See supra note 45.  Indeed, neurological studies suggest that people demonstrate higher 
degrees of support or tolerance for racial minorities that show indicia of higher socioeconomic sta-
tus.  FISKE, supra note 12. 
 60.  Lurie & Schuster, supra note 46 (examining the disproportionate representation of various 
marginalized groups in poor and homeless populations when compared to the general population). 
 61.  Id. (examining the disproportionate representation of various marginalized groups, such as 
racial minorities, in homeless populations when compared to the general population). 
 62.  SOSS ET AL., supra note 58, at 55 (noting the gradual morphing of poverty governance: 
“[M]arginalization itself does not have a static relationship to race, class, gender, or other axes of 
social division.”). 
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of race, ability, or sexual orientation and identity is wrong—or that it is sup-
posed to be.63  The Black Lives Matter movement; continuing battles over 
women’s reproductive rights; disputes over the relationship between immi-
gration, religion, and national security; and the fight for marriage equality are 
just a few examples of struggles that continue to clarify the contours of Amer-
ica’s commitment to diversity, inclusion, and social justice.  These high-vis-
ibility debates certainly do not reflect a national consensus around racism, 
sexism, or xenophobia; however, at least they register in the American con-
science.64 
Of course, the American conscience cannot and should not be oversim-
plified.  The passage of civil rights and anti-discrimination laws does not 
moot the existence of overt or implicit bias against protected groups.  In fact, 
some persuasively contend that such laws stand as testaments to the continu-
ing crises of discrimination.65  However, studies suggest the American public 
                                                          
 63.  See SOSS ET AL., supra note 58, at 54 (noting that “[e]galitarian racial norms are now 
widely promoted, and explicit racism is rarely tolerated in the discourses of the market and polity”); 
Steve Holland, Most Americans Side With Gays in Religious Freedom Disputes: Reuters/Ipsos Poll, 
REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2015, 9:13 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/09/us-usa-religion-
poll-idUSKBN0N00A720150409 (discussing poll supporting marriage equality for LGBTQ indi-
viduals); Sara K. Rankin, Invidious Deliberation: The Problem of Congressional Bias in Federal 
Hate Crime Legislation, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 563 (2014) (discussing legislative evidence of the 
relationship between public opinion, overtly expressed views of perceived social worth by legisla-
tors, and laws that support or protect these marginalized groups).   
 64.  Maggie Haberman, Poll: Anti-Discrimination Law Support, POLITICO (Sept. 30, 2013, 
5:05 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/poll-big-support-for-anti-discrimination-law-
097540.  Hate crime protections are commonly afforded to marginalized groups, except for the 
visible poor.  See Sara K. Rankin, A Homeless Bill of Rights (Revolution), 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 
383 (2015) (comparing congressional allocations of hate crime protections on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, and homelessness).  Many 
marginalized groups, but not the poor, are considered suspect or quasi-suspect classes worthy of 
heightened judicial scrutiny.  See Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization 
of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629 (2008) (re-
viewing suspect classification analyses with various marginalized groups and arguing that the clas-
sification of the poor is still unsettled).  Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 3, at 1, 4 (arguing that home-
lessness should be recognized as a protected class under Canadian law because, among other 
reasons, “it is, like several other enumerated or analogous grounds of discrimination, a social con-
struct attached to some individuals that is not immutable, but that is difficult to change”).  Another 
example of legal recognition afforded commonly marginalized groups (but not the visibly poor, at 
least so far) is disparate impact analysis under Equal Protection theories.  Most recently, the Su-
preme Court reiterated the availability of disparate impact analysis on the basis of race in Texas 
Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507 (2015).  In this case, the plaintiffs argued that the Texas Department of Housing and Commu-
nity Affairs distributed federal tax credits for low-income housing in a way that disproportionately 
affected minorities.  Id. at 2514.  The Supreme Court considered whether the language of the Fair 
Housing Act, which makes it illegal to refuse to sell, rent, or “otherwise make unavailable or deny” 
a property because of race and other categories, required that the discrimination be intentional or 
whether it permitted plaintiffs to claim a discriminatory effect, regardless of intent.  Id. at 2518.  
The Court held that the Act permitted disparate impact claims.  Id. 
 65.  The prevalence of unconscious bias is well-established.  See, e.g., King’s Dream Remains 
an Elusive Goal; Many Americans See Racial Disparities, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (Aug. 22, 
2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/08/22/kings-dream-remains-an-elusive-goal-many-
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is growing more aware of how unconscious bias might be perceived by oth-
ers, which may make people more reflective regarding overt expressions of 
discrimination.  Still, this awareness could result in the expression of more 
subtle and nuanced—but still potent and damaging—forms of discrimination.  
In other words, reductions in overt expressions of bias might suggest that 
people are learning to outwardly censor their implicit biases with respect to 
race and gender, and perhaps increasingly, with respect to sexual orientation 
and identity.  Racial Attitudes in America, an annual survey conducted since 
1997, reports that “the survey data on white racial attitudes shows improve-
ment, stagnation, or decline” in American attitudes about race.66  The princi-
pal researchers recently observed that: 
[Q]uestions of how much social distance whites prefer to keep 
from blacks, and the extent to which whites endorse negative ste-
reotypes of blacks, also show clear evidence of improvement: 
fewer and fewer white Americans readily endorse statements that 
blacks are less intelligent and hardworking than whites; and fewer 
verbally object to interracial mixing in neighborhoods and in mar-
riage partners. . . . [T]here is a need for some caution in interpret-
ing the trends from these kinds of questions because they do not 
capture all aspects of racial attitudes and because some of the lib-
eralizing trend may be due to changes in social norms about what 
kinds of answers should be reported in surveys. . . .  This in itself 
reflects a change in the racial climate in this country even if it does 
not reflect changes in the hearts and minds of white Americans.67 
And so, perhaps many forms of discrimination are improving; perhaps they 
are simply evolving and growing more sophisticated. 
But in the context of poverty, discrimination is still largely unrecognized 
as discrimination.68  Americans commonly disregard evidence that racism, 
able-ism, sexism, and homophobia are major contributors to poverty and 
                                                          
americans-see-racial-disparities/; see also Eben Harrell, Study: Racist Attitudes Are Still Ingrained, 
TIME (Jan. 8, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1870408,00.html.  Accord-
ing to Harrell, “The authors say the results suggest attitudes so deeply ingrained that protective 
legislation and affirmative-action programs are required to overcome them.  The results may even 
offer clues as to how other societies have spiraled into genocide.”  Id.; see Kerry Kawakami et al., 
Mispredicting Affective and Behavioral Responses to Racism, 323 SCIENCE 276 (2009). 
 66.  See Maria Krysan & Sarah Moberg, Trends in Racial Attitudes: A Portrait of African Amer-
ican and White Racial Attitudes, UNIV. OF ILL. (Sept. 9, 2016), http://igpa.uilli-
nois.edu/sites/igpa.uillinois.edu/files/reports/A-Portrait-of-Racial-Attitudes.pdf.  
 67.  Id.   
 68.  A majority of Americans report negative views of homeless and visibly poor people, asso-
ciating them with moral weaknesses, disorderly conduct, or bad choices that warrant their misfor-
tunes.  See discussion and notes supra Part I.B.  The increasing popularity of homeless criminaliza-
tion laws are just one example of the codification of discrimination and exile based on the low 
perceived social worth of the visibly poor.  Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3. 
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homelessness,69 and instead, embrace the belief that poor people are to blame 
for their own conditions.70  Punitive treatment of poor people on account of 
their poverty does not warrant the same legislative or judicial protections af-
forded to many other marginalized groups.71  Somehow, as further illustrated 
below, constructions of the poor as less worthy—as expressed in popular me-
dia, in political circles, or even in the enactment or enforcement of laws and 
policies that target or disproportionately impact poor people—do not gener-
ate the same level of societal introspection or caution.72  But given the inter-
sectionality of poverty, homelessness, and other marginalized traits, this phe-
nomenon may simply represent the transmutation of normatively “bad” 
discrimination into a normatively “more acceptable” form of discrimination 
against the poor.73  Thus, through the special stigmatization of poverty, the 
American conscience may be sanitizing many forms of discrimination to ap-
pear as something less objectionable or actionable: judgments about social 
worthiness.74 
                                                          
 69.  Lurie & Schuster, supra note 46 (reviewing a range of studies). 
 70.  See infra Part I.D. 
 71.  See Nice, supra note 64, at 631–36 (contesting that judicial and legislative omissions of 
the poor from legal protections results in a “dialogic default” where the constitutional rights of poor 
people are neglected); see also Rankin, supra note 64 (comparing congressional deliberations over 
hate crime protections for various marginalized groups compared to homeless people).  
 72.  See generally Rankin, supra note 63 (discussing how homeless and visibly poor people are 
largely omitted from state and federal antidiscrimination legislation that often protects other com-
monly marginalized groups from various forms of discrimination); id. (reviewing various but lim-
ited legislative efforts to advance homeless rights advocacy, including anti-discrimination legisla-
tion, across various United States and Puerto Rico).  Certainly, the omission of poverty from suspect 
classification analysis is another problematic expression of the relative social worth ranking of poor 
people compared to other commonly marginalized groups.  See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Puz-
zling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 787 (1991) (noting that judicial 
distinctions between “justifiable [and] unjustifiable disadvantaging quite plainly requires a substan-
tive value choice”); Nice, supra note 64, at 631–36.  Other overt calculations of the low social worth 
of poor people are plentiful.  See, e.g., Susan Schweik, Kicked to the Curb: Ugly Law Then and 
Now, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 11 (2011) (describing a tension in Portland, Oregon, which 
“capitalizes upon its image as an exceptionally livable, an extraordinarily progressive and tolerant 
city, while at the same time consolidating systems of disgust, phobia, and abandonment used against 
certain (non)members of the urban community”).  Social worth calculations as a policy decision-
making guide is illustrated in a recent statement by one Florida state senator, who explained his 
support for cutting mental health funding: “When it comes to funding, an 85-year-old woman in a 
nursing home matters more to me than a 45-year-old guy with a substance abuse problem . . .  It’s 
all about priorities.”  Tia Mitchell, Senate Plan Includes Big Cuts to Mental Health Programs, 
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 14, 2012, 8:51 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/health/senate-plan-
includes-big-cuts-to-mental-health-programs/1215489.  
 73.  See, e.g., Kaaryn Gustafson, supra note 58, at 648 (“The criminalization of welfare recip-
ients entails a long historical process of public discourse and welfare policies infused with race, 
class, and gender bias.”). 
 74.  Societal recognition of and response to evidence of discrimination against common out-
groups—such as racial minorities, physically or mentally disabled individuals, LGBTQ individuals, 
and women, for example—is so well established that a review of this extensive body of literature is 
not necessary here.  For a starting point, consider Rankin, supra note 64. 
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D.  The Blameworthy Poor 
Judgments about social worthiness are closely tied to the construction 
of blame.  Public support or tolerance for certain groups may turn on the 
degree to which society believes individuals are responsible for a particular 
trait.75  This relationship between perceptions of causal responsibility and 
perceptions of social worthiness resonates with traditional suspect classifica-
tion analyses, which afford higher degrees of judicial scrutiny when a law 
discriminates against a member of a suspect group who is marked by an in-
voluntary trait that cannot be changed.76  In other words, the judiciary extends 
such enhanced protection only to those who are not to blame for who they 
are.77 
Blame plays a significant role in Americans’ constructions of poverty.78  
Compared to other countries, the United States is particularly enamored with 
the “bootstrap” work ethic: the belief that, if you just work hard enough, you 
can avoid poverty.79  Approximately a quarter of Americans believe the most 
significant cause of income inequality is the failure of the poor to work as 
hard as the more affluent.80  Accordingly, American sentiment might “urge 
                                                          
 75.  See Gail Sahar, On the Importance of Attribution Theory in Political Psychology, 8 SOC. 
& PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 229, 229–49 (2014) (discussing how “[j]udgments of causal 
responsibility . . . pervade our understanding of the social world,” poverty, and homelessness and 
explaining that “perceptions of responsibility are linked to ideology and . . . influence policy atti-
tudes”).  Sahar calls for “increased communication among fields and a more systematic application 
of attributional models to the study of political judgments.”  Id. at 229; see also FISKE, supra note 
12.  The relationship between causal responsibility and social or legal judgments about worthiness 
resonate with traditional suspect classification analyses, which afford higher degrees of judicial 
scrutiny when a law has a discriminatory impact or intent on a “suspect” group that cannot change 
a trait.  Neurological studies suggest that people inherently have higher degrees of support or toler-
ance for certain racial minorities, especially when those racial minorities are of higher socioeco-
nomic status.  See id.; see also Census Data Shows Black Women and Children Impacted by Poverty 
More, ELEC. URB. REP. (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.eurweb.com/2015/10/census-data-shows-black-
women-and-children-impacted-by-poverty-more/. 
 76.  Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
 77.  See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962) (striking down a statute 
punishing individuals based on their status rather than conduct).  
 78.  MICHAEL KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: AMERICA’S ENDURING CONFRONTATION 
WITH POVERTY (2d ed. 2013) (explaining the role of blame and other related moral judgments in 
Americans’ constructions of poverty).  The visibly poor and homeless are particularly vulnerable to 
this judgment.  See, e.g., Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 3.  Homelessness is often “explained and 
addressed as in individual moral failure rather than in relation to its structural causes, so that the 
victims of economic changes leading to displacement or unemployment were blamed for their pre-
dicament, suspected of being a threat to society and likely to engage in serious criminality.”  Id. at 
10.   
 79.  See, e.g., Bruce Stokes, Is Laziness the Cause of Economic Inequality? Americans and the 
British Lean Toward Moral Weakness, but the Rest of the World Blames Government Policies, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 22, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/22/is-laziness-the-cause-of-eco-
nomic-inequality/.  
 80.  Most See Inequality Growing, But Partisans Differ Over Solutions, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 
(Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/01/23/most-see-inequality-growing-but-parti-
sans-differ-over-solutions/. 
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pity for those who are worse off, and we do pity certain unfortunates, but 
only those who have landed at the bottom through no fault of their own.  Oth-
erwise, under meritocracy, they deserve their fate and are beneath consider-
ation.”81 
Blame also plays into theories of property—that is, whether one’s work 
and productivity justifies the acquisition or ownership of property.  The la-
bor-desert “principle rests on a conception of persons as agents who, by their 
actions in the world, are responsible for changes in it and so deserve or are 
entitled to something.”82  Placed in the context of poverty, the labor-desert 
principle fits neatly with American attitudes: a poor person likely did some-
thing (like make bad decisions) or failed to do something (like work hard 
enough) that caused his or her poverty.  The labor-desert principle does not 
account for institutional or structural discrimination that limits meaningful 
opportunities, nor does it contemplate health or social conditions, such as 
addiction or mental illness, which undercut the labor-desert calculation.  
Thus, blame serves as a blunt but effective instrument, partitioning those who 
deserve the benefits of full membership in society from those who have not 
earned the privilege.83 
E.  The Criminal Poor 
Blame also facilitates a host of other negative associations, commonly 
expressed in the “broken windows theory,” a criminal justice framework that 
equates visible, undesirable people with criminality.84  The broken windows 
theory suggests that if a community fails to swiftly and adequately respond 
to the first signs of disorder in a neighborhood, such as a broken window, 
                                                          
 81.  FISKE, supra note 12, at 27. Some scholars attribute these perceptions to negative stereo-
typing, prejudices, and discrimination, often associated with moral judgments and assumptions that 
visibly poor people are to blame for their condition.  See, e.g., BLAU, supra note 8; see also Sylvestre 
& Bellot, supra note 3.  Amy Wax has also examined America’s belief that welfare recipients should 
earn, owe something in return, or otherwise be deserving of public aid.  See generally Amy L. Wax, 
Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political Economy of 
Welfare Reform, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257 (2000).   
 82.  Munzer, supra note 25, at 4.   
 83.  Like laws and policies writ large, legal scholarship often reflects tensions in ideological or 
normative judgments about the social worthiness of homeless and visibly poor people.  Compare 
Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, 
and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996), Robert C. Ellickson, The Homelessness Mud-
dle, 99 PUB. INT. 45, 59 (1990) (expressing conservative social and economic policy critiques of 
homelessness), and Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 
295 (1991) (critiquing “liberal” advocacy positions with respect to homelessness) with MARGARET 
KOHN, BRAVE NEW NEIGHBORHOODS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC SPACE 167–85 (2004) (cri-
tiquing Ellickson’s and Waldron’s theories and advocating for more inclusive public space), and 
Stephen Wizner, Homelessness: Advocacy and Social Policy, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 387 (critiquing 
Ellickson’s theories and observing rifts between typical “conservative” and “liberal” perspectives 
on homelessness). 
 84.  George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29. 
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those signs then serve as a beacon, signaling to hungry lawbreakers that the 
neighborhood does not attend to public order.85  These signals attract new 
potential offenders, result in more disorder and crime, and drive away any 
remaining law-abiding citizens.86  Due to inadequate social and legal re-
sponses to the first broken window, the neighborhood steps onto a greased 
slope, facing downhill, sliding into urban decay.87 
Even in its earliest iterations, the broken windows theory had special 
application to “street people,”88 who are commonly associated with disor-
derly acts such as being “disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable.”89  In 
this way, homeless and visibly poor people themselves actually become “bro-
ken windows,” threatening to undermine the order and safety of public space.  
Thus, the broken windows theory supports a normative judgment that such 
people should be removed from view because “their choice to live on the 
streets is disruptive to others.”90  Although the broken windows theory has 
been widely discredited as fundamentally flawed,91 anti-democratic,92 and 
discriminatory,93 it continues to play a potent and persistent role in criminal 
justice and policymaking circles—especially in application to marginalized 
groups, including homeless and visibly poor people.94 
                                                          
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Id.; see also GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: 
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 8 (1996). 
 89.  Kelling & Wilson, supra note 85. 
 90.  KELLING & COLES, supra note 88, at 66.  Studies belie suggestions that homelessness and 
poverty are voluntary conditions.  See Lurie & Schuster, supra note 46 (finding that certain margin-
alized groups are disproportionately impacted by homelessness because of systemic discrimina-
tion); Suzanne Skinner, SEATTLE UNIV. HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, Shut Out: How 
Barriers Often Prevent Meaningful Access to Emergency Shelter (Sara K. Rankin ed., 2016), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2776421. 
 91.  See GARY BLASI, UCLA SCH. OF LAW, POLICING OUR WAY OUT OF HOMELESSNESS? THE 
FIRST YEAR OF THE SAFER CITIES INITIATIVE ON SKID ROW (2007), http://www.ced.berke-
ley.edu/downloads/pubs/faculty/wolch_2007_report-card-policing-homelessness.pdf; John E. Eck 
& Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime? An Assessment of the 
Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman, eds., 2000); 
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS 
POLICING (2001).   
 92.  See, e.g., STEVE HERBERT, CITIZENS, COPS, AND POWER: RECOGNIZING THE LIMITS OF 
COMMUNITY (2006). 
 93.  The broken windows theory is understood as a major driver of stop-and-frisk policies, 
which are roundly criticized as racially discriminatory.  Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops 
and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 
464 (2000); Daniel Bergner, Is Stop-and-Frisk Worth It?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2014), http://www.theat-
lantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/04/is-stop-and-frisk-worth-it/358644/. 
 94.  Olson & MacDonald, supra note 15; Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3; see also Marie-Eve Syl-
vestre, Narratives of Punishment: Neoliberalism, Class Interests and the Politics of Social Exclu-
sion, 7 EUR. J. HOMELESSNESS 363, 364 (2013) (agreeing with others that the repression of poor 
and homeless people cannot be totally attributed to broken windows policing, but maintaining that 
RankinFinalBookProof 10/31/2016  12:22 PM 
24 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:4 
Thus, complex dynamics—economic, psychological, sociological, and 
spatial—feed American perceptions of poor people.  Indeed, perceptions of 
poverty may be the most salient factor in American determinations of social 
worthiness; perceived poverty generally depresses judgments of social 
worth.95  This moral calculation may be even more pronounced for homeless 
and visibly poor people, even when compared to the generic poor.96  Yet, 
before we can understand how this special stigma influences the increasing 
exile of visibly poor people from public space, it helps to next investigate 
concepts of public space itself. 
II.  OUR VIEW OF PUBLIC SPACE: A STAGE FOR THE INFLUENCE OF EXILE 
Place can be a powerful weapon of social and political control.97 
A lightning rod for apportioning rights based on one’s perceived wor-
thiness is the negotiation of public space.  Public space fascinates a broad 
range of disciplines, including urban studies, sociology, geography, political 
science, anthropology, peace studies, architecture, and philosophy.98  The in-
terdisciplinary attraction may be due to the fact that public space has such 
crucial physical, social, legal, and political meaning.  This Section briefly 
surveys interdisciplinary perspectives on human contests to control and de-
fine it. 
In a purely physical sense, public space refers to any combination of a 
built and natural environment that is accessible to the public as a whole for 
collective or personal activities.99  But public space may be more accurately 
defined as “all areas that are open and accessible to all members of the public 
                                                          
broken windows theories have “been widely and conveniently used as legitimating discourses to 
justify existing repressive practices” in the United States and elsewhere).   
 95.  For example, neurological studies suggest that people show higher degrees of support or 
tolerance for certain racial minorities when those individuals are associated with indicia of higher 
socioeconomic status.  See FISKE, supra note 12. 
 96.  Many sociological theories suggest that stigma and inequality-legitimating ideologies re-
sult in higher degrees of stigma for homeless people versus poor people generally. See, e.g., Phelan 
et al., supra note 46 (reviewing such theories and related studies). 
 97.  Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 581 (2006). 
 98.  See generally Judit Bodnar, Reclaiming Public Space, 52 URB. STUD. 2090 (2015) (re-
viewing decades of cross-disciplinary obsessions with the topic of public space); see also Zachary 
Neal, Seeking Common Ground: Three Perspectives on Public Space, 163 URB. DESIGN & PLAN. 
59 (2010) (reviewing various disciplinary perspectives on public space). 
 99.  See MATTHEW CARMONA ET AL., PUBLIC PLACES-URBAN SPACES: THE DIMENSIONS OF 
URBAN DESIGN 111 (2003); STEPHEN CARR ET AL., PUBLIC SPACE (1992); see also Public, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining public as “[o]pen or available for all to use, 
share, or enjoy”). 
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in a society, in principle though not necessarily in practice.”100  This adden-
dum—“in principle though not necessarily in practice”—is key.  In theory, 
truly public space should be equally accessible to everyone, but in reality it 
is not.  Determining who controls and defines access to public space is a 
complicated playground for the influence of exile.  In constructions of public 
space, who is a member of the public?  Who decides the terms of this mem-
bership and correlated access to public space? 
A.  Socio-Political Constructions of Public Space 
Socio-political constructions of public space often center on diversity, 
difference, and democratic function.  Public space, according to some com-
mentators, is a bastion of democratization.101  The fundamental purpose of 
public space in a democratic society goes beyond being a shared forum 
equally accessible to all people; sharing public space actually challenges our 
instincts to create social segregation by physically integrating us with diverse 
strangers.102  Public space is a unique forum for self-expression and the cre-
ation of identity, which requires interaction with others—especially 
strangers.103  Thus, sharing public space tests our tolerance for diversity, in-
cluding our exposure to and engagement with “otherness.”  But it also pre-
sents opportunities to advance our social growth, our understanding of our-
selves, and the world around us.  Indeed, “democracy requires physical space 
for its performance.”104 
Moreover, the difference and diversity values of public space are unique 
and irreplaceable: “Public streets and sidewalks are the only remaining sites 
of public expression and ‘unscripted political activity,’ and their main func-
tion is making poverty and inequality visible.”105  Many critics reject a mon-
olithic, normative construction “of the public sphere, suggesting that it should 
                                                          
 100.  COMMON GROUND? READINGS AND REFLECTIONS ON PUBLIC SPACE 1 (Anthony Orum 
& Zachary Neal eds., 2010).  For more on the definitional complexity of the public/private distinc-
tion, see Jeff Weintraub, The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction, in PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE IN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON A GRAND DICHOTOMY 7 (Alan Wolfe 
ed., 1997). 
 101.  See, e.g., JOHN R. PARKINSON, DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC SPACE: THE PHYSICAL SITES OF 
DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE 24 (2012). 
 102.  Some scholars frame a democratic ideal of public space as “the commons.”  See DAVID 
BOLLIER, SILENT THEFT: THE PRIVATE PLUNDER OF OUR COMMON WEALTH 2–3 (2003) (describ-
ing public, or common, space as the “valuable resources that the American people collectively 
own”).  Similarly, Professor Lawrence Lessig describes the commons as a resource for “joint use or 
possession; to be held or enjoyed equally by a number of persons.”  LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE 
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 19 (2002) (quoting Com-
mons, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY); PARKINSON, supra note 101. 
 103.  As one scholar observes: “It is easy to forget that public space thrives on diversity and the 
lack thereof can kill it.”  Bodnar, supra note 98, at 2095.   
 104.  PARKINSON, supra note 101, at 4.   
 105.  Bodnar, supra note 98, at 2097 (quoting KOHN, supra note 83). 
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include . . . a variety of subaltern or counter-publics.”106  Even frictions with 
others is of significant value; “in the presence of difference people have at 
least the possibility to step outside themselves,” creating opportunities for 
personal growth.107  The price of this opportunity is engagement with 
strangers and their associated differences, which can produce feelings of anx-
iety or fear.108 
Proximity to different people, views, and behaviors may also be the key 
to overcoming fear and to forming new socio-spatial connections.  In social 
science, for example, the contact hypothesis suggests that exposure of em-
powered in-groups to highly-stigmatized out-groups can favorably change 
the attitudes and perspectives of in-groups with respect to out-groups.109 
City centers, exemplars of public space, hold the promise to engage us 
in the reality of “living among strangers, [creating] the very basis of public 
space where civility towards diversity and difference rules.”110  In this sense, 
public space teaches us the value of tolerance, cultivating “the constant and 
intense proximity of difference” that “makes civility a pressing moral and 
sociological requirement.”111  Engaging diverse strangers “presupposes an 
active and affirmative moral relationship between persons” and the moral 
equality it suggests is instrumental in the rise of a democratic public 
sphere.112  Such socio-political constructions of public space suggest an ideal 
of city centers as a crucial venue for interaction, difference, and exercising 
tolerance. 
But such ideals conflict with America’s commitment to disorder-sup-
pression or broken windows-type policies.  Robert Ellickson starkly animates 
the spatialization of social order in his influential article, Controlling Chronic 
Misconduct in City Spaces.113  He argues that certain behaviors associated 
with visibly poor people, such as begging, violate community norms of civil-
ity and appropriateness.  Accordingly, cities should confine certain non-con-
forming people to specific zones where undesirable people can be more ef-
fectively policed.114  Ellickson proposes a color-coded zoning system to 
allocate downtown space, a system “modeled on traffic lights with red sig-
naling caution to the ordinary pedestrian, yellow, some caution, and green, a 
                                                          
 106.  Neal, supra note 98, at 63 (citing to and discussing many of these theories). 
 107.  Bodnar, supra note 98, at 2093. 
 108.  Id. at 2092 (describing how interactions with strangers or other evidence of difference can 
be “unpleasant and sometime even frightening . . . .  Unknown and unassimilated otherness can pro-
duce cognitive and emotional shocks”). 
 109.  See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 34, at 40 (concluding that “multiple types of ingroup expo-
sure” to homeless people can have a positive influence on in-groups’ opinions and beliefs about 
people experiencing homelessness). 
 110.  Bodnar, supra note 98, at 2091. 
 111.  Richard Boyd, ‘The Value of Civility?’, 43 URB. STUD. 863, 871 (2006). 
 112.  Id. at 875. 
 113.  See Ellickson, supra note 83.   
 114.  Id. at 1208–09.   
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promise of safety.”115  Red zones would allow noise, public drunkenness, 
prostitution, and other forms of “disorderly conduct.”116  Yellow zones would 
prohibit “offensive” activities such as panhandling and other “public nui-
sances,” but some “flamboyant and eccentric conduct” would be permitted.117  
Green zones would serve as a refuge for the “unusually sensitive” members 
of society, such as children and elderly people.118  Strict social controls in 
green zone sanctuaries would prohibit any potentially “disruptive” activities 
which are currently legal, such as dog walking or playing a radio.119  Accord-
ing to Ellickson’s logic, segregating people based on their compliance with 
community norms would ensure that downtown space is most efficiently en-
joyed. 
Such “zoning by behavior” proposals have been both embraced120 and 
vigorously critiqued as discriminatory or Orwellian,121 and yet, as further ex-
plained below, they are also fairly characterized as the “prevailing logic” be-
hind contemporary regulations of public space.122  Clear tensions exist be-
tween the ideals of creating and maintaining inclusive and diverse public 
space that encourages difference and discomfort when compared to ideals 
that segregate people based on their perceived compliance with in-group 
norms.  Marginalized groups—by the very nature of their marginalization—
have little power in the negotiation of this tension or its manifestation in the 
American conscience, laws, and policies. 
B.  Legal Constructions of Public Space 
The law has long been fascinated with the regulation of public space.  
Part of this fascination concerns the thorny exercise of distinguishing be-
tween public and private property and the constitutional rights or obligations 
attendant to a property’s categorization.  In the property context, government-
owned property is frequently construed as “public” property in contrast to 
“everything else.”123  But, “in the modern world of quasi-public entities and 
governmental privatization, attempts to categorize entities, properties, and 
                                                          
 115.  KOHN, supra note 83, at 168 (discussing Ellickson, supra note 83, at 1120). 
 116.  Ellickson, supra note 83, at 1221. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 1221–22.  
 119.  Id. at 1222. 
 120.  See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 57, 70–73 (2011) (discussing Ellickson’s zoning proposal and describing the presence of “tran-
sient homeless populations[s]” in public space as undesirable and requiring heightened governmen-
tal or private management to “enforce social norms”).   
 121.  Munzer, supra note 25, at 40. 
 122.  KOHN, supra note 83; see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2004) (describing the persistence of broken windows theory in public zoning 
regulations). 
 123.  See MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 
29 (2002).   
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activities as strictly public or private have led to frustration and uncer-
tainty.”124 
Legal narratives commonly center on the right to exclude.  Legal schol-
arship frequently reflects on the “tragedy of the commons,” an economically-
oriented belief that public space ultimately degrades when governmental or 
private managers fail to exclude potential users who lack incentives to con-
serve or sustain the space as a shared resource.125  As further explained below, 
some narratives challenge the law’s obsession with exclusion, arguing for a 
construct more consistent with inclusion and diversity.  But these critiques 
are themselves outliers because, in most respects, they do not represent the 
current state of the law. 
1.  Exile in Property Law 
Property law is a fundamental node in American hierarchical construc-
tions of space.  Indeed, the right to exclude others is “one of the most essential 
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”126  
Through exclusion, property expresses its meaning in terms of the acquisi-
tion, access, occupation, use, and ownership of resources, including physical 
space. 
a.  Property Zoning and Regulations 
Broken windows policies—which, as previously discussed, suppress 
evidence of normatively defined disorder and feed the stigmatization of vis-
ibly poor people—not only permeate the American approaches to criminal 
justice and community policing, but they also influence American property 
regulations.  Nicole Garnett investigates the relationship between “order-
maintenance efforts” and property regulation in her article, Ordering (and 
Order in) the City.127  She acknowledges that “disorder suppression” is the 
                                                          
 124.  Paul M. Schoenhard, A Three-Dimensional Approach to the Public-Private Distinction, 
2008 UTAH L. REV. 635, 636 (2008).  Shoenhard surveys other commentary on the “decline of the 
public-private distinction,” including Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s regret over the majority deci-
sion in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (opining 
that the majority reasoning served to “wash out any distinction between private and public use of 
property”).   
 125.  The “tragedy of the commons” was coined by Garrett Hardin in The Tragedy of the Com-
mons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).  Illustrative commentary includes Carol Rose, The Comedy of 
the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986) 
(reviewing the history of legal doctrine concerning public access to private property), and Foster, 
supra note 120, at 57 (contending that the tragedy of the commons occurs “during periods of ‘reg-
ulatory slippage’—when the level of local government oversight . . . significantly declines”). 
 126.  Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see also Thomas W. Merrill, 
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (arguing “the right to exclude 
others” is more than just “one of the most essential constituents of property—it is its sine qua non”). 
 127.  Garnett, supra note 122, at 3.  
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“first function of property regulation.”128  Efforts such as the authorization of 
private property inspections129 and public nuisance lawsuits130 codify the pri-
ority of suppressing disorder.  Indeed, Garnett goes further, suggesting that 
“our dominant form of property regulation—Euclidean zoning—has ad-
dressed the spatial separation of different land uses rather than property con-
ditions.  That is, the point of ubiquitous zoning laws is to put ‘everything in 
its place,’ to segregate economic from noneconomic activities, rich from 
poor, etc.”131 
Garnett challenges the codification of disorder-suppression ideologies, 
which erroneously “equate ordered land uses with the absence of disorder.”132  
She shows that collectively, such pervasive property regulations devastate 
“the social and economic prospects of poor people.”133  Such over-regulation 
or “misregulation” of property actually “impede[s] efforts to restore a vi-
brant, healthy, and organic public order.”134  Having laid bare some of the 
potentially negative impacts of property regulations on marginalized com-
munities, Garnett stops short of examining why property law might operate 
this way.  Instead, she endeavors to reconcile her critique of property regula-
tion rules with “the social norms justifications for the order-maintenance 
agenda.”135 Accordingly, her recommendations fall in line with the economic 
compass that predictably guides so much of property law.136  This approach, 
like that of the law generally, leaves the influence of exile undisturbed. 
b.  Progressive Property Critiques 
A collection of “progressive property” scholars have perhaps come clos-
est to exposing the influence of exile on property law.  These scholars critique 
American law and policy as not only generally obsessed with exclusion, but 
as specifically bent on the exclusion of marginalized groups.137  Professor 
                                                          
 128.  Id. at 7. 
 129.  Id. at 13–19. 
 130.  Id. at 20–21. 
 131.  Id. at 21. 
 132.  Id. at 5.   
 133.  Id. at 26. 
 134.  Id. at 5. 
 135.  Id. at 42. 
 136.  For example, Garnett suggests that single-use zoning laws, such as those that prohibit in-
home childcare or other entrepreneurial efforts, should be revisited because they stifle “community 
renewal.”  Id. at 57–58.  Compare Garnett’s critique with Marc Roark’s critique in Homelessness at 
the Cathedral, 80 MO. L. REV. 53 (2015) (critiquing norm-driven frameworks of property law on 
the basis that the “dominant” community identity influences the regulation of public and private 
space to the exclusion of people experiencing homelessness). 
 137.  Indeed, Professor Rosser describes progressive property theory as the contemporary “site 
of intervention to challenge the extent to which property rights trump the interests of the property-
less.”  Rosser, supra note 28, at 114. 
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Ezra Rosser describes this developing field as comprised of two linked prop-
ositions: “(1) that conventional law and economics and the related assump-
tion of a single metric—efficiency—should not be the sole means of evalu-
ating laws and establishing property norms, and (2) that alternative, 
progressive frameworks should be used.”138  Rosser further explains that pro-
gressive property scholars represent “both a reaction against the particularly 
strong influence of economic approaches to the law and an assertion that 
property lawmaking must be more nuanced, more expressly political, and less 
preoccupied with the owner’s right to exclude.”139 
Progressive property theorists argue that American property law should 
be reconstructed to reflect owners’ social140 and moral141 obligations, includ-
ing the call to better support civility142 and democratic principles.143  Property 
expresses and reproduces power,144 so progressive property theorists argue 
that the law “should promote the ability of each person to obtain the material 
resources necessary for full social and political participation.”145 
By pushing such radical reconstructions of the law and legal discourse, 
progressive property norms challenge deep American conceptions of prop-
erty.  Still, some think progressive property theories are not radical enough.  
For example, Rosser claims that progressive property theories still fail to ad-
equately emphasize “the troubling origins of ownership in the United 
States,”146 which limits progressive property scholars’ analysis and advo-
cacy, especially around the redistribution of property rights to atone for “prior 
wrongful acquisition” and to correct “related, currently experienced inequal-
ity.”147  Rosser offers examples of “the racialized nature of acquisition and 
distribution”148 in American history, including the forced dispossession of 
                                                          
 138.  Id. at 110. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  See id. (discussing Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Prop-
erty Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009)). 
 141.  Peñalver, supra note 26. 
 142.  Professor Alexander calls this “human flourishing.” Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-
Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 770 (2009). 
 143.  Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic So-
ciety, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1047 (2009).  For Professor Singer, property law should reflect 
democratic principles, such as our social obligations to one another and the need to “treat[] each 
person with equal concern and respect.”  Id. at 1037.  
 144.  Rosser, supra note 28, at 126; see also Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 757, 757 (2009) (noting “perhaps the most ubiquitous and important messages 
that property communicates have to do with relative status, with the material world defining and 
reinforcing a variety of economic, social, and cultural hierarchies”). 
 145.  Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
743, 744 (2009). 
 146.  Rosser, supra note 28, at 127. 
 147.  Id. at 111. 
 148.  Id.  
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Native American lands and “the systematic exploitation of African Ameri-
cans, first as slaves and later as second-class citizens.”149  According to 
Rosser, American property law not only fails to appreciate this tainted his-
tory, but also perpetuates such oppression and exploitation through doctrines 
and practices of inheritance.150 
Despite progressive property theorists’ common focus on private prop-
erty, these critiques translate to laws and policies concerning public space.  
Integrating Rosser’s critique, progressive property scholars not only chal-
lenge property law’s codifications of the instinct to exclude, but they also 
suggest how dominant groups may express unconscious biases and discrimi-
nation against marginalized groups through the rules of property.  Indeed, 
many of these scholars’ concerns about the role of discrimination in the con-
text of private property arguably become more pointed and urgent when they 
are extended to public space. 
2.  Exile Under the First Amendment 
First Amendment jurisprudence ostensibly implicates values of diver-
sity and difference in public space; however, as explained herein, it also fails 
to adequately address the influence of exile.151  At first blush, things seem 
promising for marginalized groups.  Governmental decisions about how to 
regulate public space are generally presumed to be constitutional,152 but when 
First Amendment rights are implicated, the burden shifts to the state to justify 
any restriction on speech.153  In reviewing a free speech challenge to a gov-
ernmental regulation of public space, courts will modify the level of judicial 
scrutiny depending on just how “public” the property is deemed to be.154  This 
                                                          
 149.  Id. at 128–33 (examining the role of colonialism and the dispossession of Indian land); id. 
at 133–40 (examining the role of slavery and racism). 
 150.  Id. at 128 (“Society . . . treats property acquisition as a given, disconnected from past 
wrongs, even as new generations inherit the benefits and harms of property’s racial legacy.”).   
 151.  See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).  The First Amendment provides, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Gen-
erally, First Amendment rights only extend to the expression of speech on public but not private 
property.  Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568 (1972).  Of course, the constitutionality 
of governmental regulation of public spaces is challenged under many other theories than free 
speech. See infra Part III.C (surveying various legal challenges to criminalization laws). 
 152.  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973); United States v. Bol-
linger, 966 F. Supp. 2d 568, 571 (W.D.N.C. 2013); see James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of 
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 156 (1893).   
 153.  E.g. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999); 
Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1209 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 
 154.  See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).   
RankinFinalBookProof 10/31/2016  12:22 PM 
32 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:4 
inquiry—commonly referred to as public forum analysis—turns on the value 
of the public space as a site of expression and communication of ideas.155 
Quintessential public fora include places like streets, sidewalks, and 
parks, which “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public 
and . . . have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”156  Indeed, the First 
Amendment protects the expression of offensive and disagreeable speech in 
public fora on the grounds that it is essential to American democracy.157  Ac-
cordingly, a governmental regulation of speech in a public forum is subject 
to stricter scrutiny158 if it is content-based,159 rather than if it is content-neutral 
with respect to time, place, or manner.  This restriction is warranted because 
the former “raises a very serious concern that the government is using its 
power to tilt public debate in a direction of its choosing.”160  In this sense, 
First Amendment concerns appear consistent with socio-political values of 
diversity and difference in public space, even when the protection of those 
values might result in confrontation, tension, and discomfort.161  Such pro-
tection is particularly vital to the rights of marginalized groups, political out-
siders whose views and interests fall outside of, or conflict with, the priorities 
of governing in-groups.162  Accordingly, marginalized groups frequently rely 
                                                          
 155.  See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992).  Cri-
tiques of the public forum doctrine abound.  See, e.g., Zick, supra note 97, at 586 n.26 & 27 (citing 
several such critiques). 
 156.  Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague, 307 U.S. at 515). 
 157.  “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government 
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).  “[F]reedom to differ is not limited to 
things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance 
is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.”  West Virginia State Bd. 
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 158.  Content-based restrictions “must satisfy strict scrutiny—that is, [they] must be the least 
restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.”  McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 
2530 (2014); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (requiring “the Gov-
ernment to prove that [a content-based] restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly 
tailored to achieve that interest” (quoting Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2817 (2011)). 
 159.  Reed also distinguished between “viewpoint discrimination” and “content discrimination.”  
Viewpoint discrimination regulates speech based on “the specific motivating ideology or the opin-
ion or perspective of the speaker.”  Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. of 
N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)).  By contrast, content discrimina-
tion prohibits a broad topic from discussion.  Id.  A law “targeted at specific subject matter is content 
based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter.”  Id. 
 160.  Cutting v. City of Portland, 802 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2015).   
 161.  For First Amendment purposes, a person walking down a street or sidewalk might be “con-
fronted with an uncomfortable message” that they cannot avoid; this “is a virtue, not a vice.” McCul-
len, 134 S. Ct. at 2529. 
 162.  See supra Part I about systemic discrimination and power hierarchies.  See also Zick, supra 
note 97, at 584–85 (“Social and political movements often require disruption and a degree of con-
frontation with authority in order to be even marginally effective.”).  Zick contends that the problem 
is particularly acute in America, noting that First Amendment jurisprudence routinely allows for the 
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on public space as a venue to effectively communicate their needs to wide 
audiences.163 
But the First Amendment may not adequately protect marginalized 
groups who represent dissention from social norms or who offend common 
sensibilities—the very sort of speech the First Amendment is supposed to 
protect.164  Courts often construe speech restrictions as content-neutral165; ac-
cordingly, courts often defer to governmental proffers that such restrictions 
are necessary to maintain order or security.166  Through a functionally “weak 
strain of rationality review,”167 city and state governments “have learned to 
manipulate geography in a manner that now seriously threatens basic First 
Amendment principles.”168  In other words, spatial regulations are evolving 
and adapting in order to effectively mitigate speech critical of the status quo, 
yet still avoid potential constitutional liability. 
Although, visibly poor people engage in various forms of protest that 
cities increasingly prohibit or restrict despite the First Amendment.169  Con-
sider a threshold example: visibly poor people who speak in public by asking 
for help.  City-wide bans against begging are on the rise,170 despite the fact 
that begging is a well-established form of constitutionally protected 
                                                          
“neutering [of] political dissent, [while] protesters in countries deemed far less friendly to dissent 
are discovering the power that comes with the ability to access, even commandeer, public spaces.”  
Id. at 587. 
 163.  See Michael Lipsky, Protest as a Political Resource, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1144, 1144 
(1968) (suggesting that public protest “represents an important aspect of minority group and low 
income group politics”); see also LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNNY OF THE MAJORITY: 
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 135 (1994) (charting the relationship 
between American territorial districting and the disempowerment of politically powerless groups). 
 164.  See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (describing the purpose of First 
Amendment protections).  As discussed in Part III, infra, visibly poor people engage in various 
forms of protest by virtue of their very existence in public space. 
 165.  Zick, supra note 97, at 583. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. at 584, 589–90 (“Political dissent has become spatial tactics’ principal casualty.”). 
 169.  See id.  For example, anti-camping bans have been challenged under the First Amendment.  
Tents and other temporary structures have been found to be viable instruments of political speech.  
See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); ACORN v. City of Tulsa, 
835 F.2d 735, 742 (10th Cir. 1987); Occupy Minneapolis v. Cty. of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d 
1062, 1069, 1071 (D. Minn. 2011) (sleeping and overnight occupation of tents in a park was ex-
pressive conduct protected by First Amendment, although it could be regulated by a permit scheme 
that functions as a valid time, place, or manner restriction); Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort 
Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (same); Students Against Apartheid Coal. v. 
O’Neill, 660 F. Supp. 333 (W.D. Va. 1987); Univ. of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 
649 F. Supp. 1200, 1204–05 (D. Utah 1986).  Other potential First Amendment applications to 
visibly poor people, such as the right to assemble and protest, are further discussed infra, Part III.   
 170.  NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15. 
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speech.171  Although the judiciary offers some protection from violations of 
this First Amendment right, it has not been a consistently reliable refuge.172 
Moreover, cities often attempt to avoid heightened judicial scrutiny by 
drafting their anti-begging laws “broadly, under the counterintuitive rationale 
that they can mitigate First Amendment problems . . . by restricting more 
speech.”173  For example, Everett, Washington’s city council recently 
amended its “aggressive” panhandling law to be more expansive than the 
prior version, which had specifically provided that the defendant cause or 
attempt to cause “another person reasonably to fear imminent bodily harm or 
the commission of a criminal act upon their person, or upon property in their 
immediate possession.”174  But in January of 2015, Everett’s city council in-
serted the word “charities” to suggest the aggressive panhandling law might 
apply to charitable organizations as well as individuals,175 a move fairly crit-
icized as pretext.176  Indeed, Everett went further, removing any concrete ex-
amples of when or how a defendant’s conduct might trigger reasonable fear, 
requiring simply that the defendant undertake “conduct that would make a 
reasonable person fearful or feel compelled.”177  As explained earlier in this 
Article, social science and popular sentiment suggest that people increasingly 
find it reasonable to be fearful or feel compelled when confronted with visible 
poverty—even in the form of peaceable panhandling.178  Accordingly, such 
a broad intent-to-intimidate standard is circular and problematic: panhandlers 
intend to ask people for money, and merely doing so often makes people feel 
                                                          
 171.  Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980); Julia Koest-
ner, Begging the (First Amendment) Question: The Constitutionality of Arizona’s Prohibition of 
Begging in a Public Place, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1227, 1243 (2013); Charles Mitchell, Aggressive Pan-
handling Legislation and Free Speech Claims: Begging for Trouble, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 697, 
698 (1994). 
 172.  See Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and the 
Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896 (1991); Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigue and the First 
Amendment: Are the Homeless Constitutional Castaways?, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 266 (1994); 
see also NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15. 
 173.  Joseph Mead, The First Amendment Protection of Charitable Speech, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 
FURTHERMORE 57, 59 (2015). 
 174.  EVERETT, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 9.52, § 010 (1987) (amended 2015), https://ever-
ettwa.gov/AgendaCenter/ViewFile/Item/3260?fileID=18048; Letter from Jennifer Shaw, Nancy 
Talner & Jon Cooper, American Civil Liberties Union, to Ray Stephanson, Mayor, City of Everett 
(Oct. 27, 2015), https://aclu-wa.org/docs/aclu-says-everett-s-panhandling-law-punishes-free-
speech-poor-people. 
 175.  EVERETT, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 9.52, § 010 (2015). 
 176.  Letter from the Homeless Rights Advocacy Project et al. to Ray Stephanson, Mayor, City 
of Everett (Oct. 27, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter]; Mead, supra note 173, at 60 
(noting that “the very use of the word ‘panhandling’ lays bare the legislative purpose”). 
 177.  EVERETT, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 9.52, § 010 (2015). 
 178.  See supra Part I.B–D.  See also Letter, supra note 176, at 3 (“Moreover, people often re-
spond because they feel compelled—and compelled for many reasons, including sympathy—but 
feeling compulsion without threated or actual aggression is not a threat to public safety.”) 
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compelled or fearful.  Thus, such anti-begging laws fail to distinguish be-
tween truly dangerous or aggressive behavior and merely perceived danger, 
a common consequence of witnessing someone who appears to be in desper-
ate circumstances.  Accordingly, increasingly popular laws like Everett’s 
functionally conflate even peaceable begging—constitutionally protected 
speech—with criminality.179 
Cities commonly invoke phrases like “public safety” to insulate them-
selves from First Amendment challenges, and courts frequently defer to such 
rationales.180  Of course, public safety is a compelling interest because it is 
“the heart of the government’s function”181; however, the definition of “pub-
lic safety” must also be understood in the context of the instinct to construct 
poor people as blameworthy or criminal.182  The potential for unconscious 
bias, especially in the context of judicial discretion,183 means that courts may 
accept governmental rationalizations for reducing visible evidence of pov-
erty—such as homeless encampments or panhandling.  These rationalizations 
include public safety (because visible poverty is perceived as dangerous) or 
the stimulation of tourism (because visible poverty is inconsistent with con-
sumerism).184  In other words, courts have upheld laws that effectively push 
visibly poor people out of public space merely because visible evidence of 
human desperation tends to undermine feelings of safety or the desire to 
shop.185 
                                                          
 179.  NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 20 (noting seventy-six percent of surveyed cities pro-
hibit begging in particular public places and a twenty-five percent overall increase of city-wide bans 
on begging in public).  Cities are not only broadening their anti-begging laws; they often share 
model ordinance language with each other, allowing such restrictive laws to proliferate nationwide.  
See, e.g., Mead, supra note 173, at 59 n.3; Nick Licata, Inside the Conservative Plan to Take Over 
City Politics, CROSSCUT (Jan. 6, 2016), http://crosscut.com/2016/01/a-seattle-liberal-ventures-into-
a-den-of-conservative-activism/. 
 180.  See, e.g., Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2014) (accepting city’s justi-
fication of public safety as basis for holding the anti-begging law was content-neutral), vacated, 135 
S. Ct. 2887 (2015); Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 2014), rev’d on reh’g, 
806 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive 
Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 439, 440 (2006) (critiquing First Amendment jurisprudence 
and arguing that “[c]ourts routinely conclude that the government’s (unsubstantiated) interests out-
weigh the rights of speakers”). 
 181.  Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. City of League City, 488 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 182.  See supra Part I (discussing views of poor people as blameworthy or criminal). 
 183.  The judiciary is not immune to unconscious bias.  See, e.g., Michele Benedetto Neitz, So-
cioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137, 154 (2013); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit 
Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012). 
 184.  NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 12 (surveying these laws and noting they are “designed 
to move visibly homeless people out of commercial and tourist districts or, increasingly, out of 
entire cities, [and] are often justified as necessary public health and public safety measures”). 
 185.  BECKETT & HERBERT, supra note 40, at 21 (“[M]any simply do not wish to see those who 
appear disorderly or otherwise inspire trepidation.  Nor is it pleasant to be reminded of the depriva-
tions associated with homelessness, severe poverty, addiction, or mental illness.”). 
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Things may be looking up for visibly poor people who ask for charity 
in public.186  For some time, circuits have been split about whether such broad 
restrictions on charitable speech, including begging, are content-based re-
strictions subject to strict scrutiny.187  However, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,188 
the United States Supreme Court clarified the definition of a content-based 
restriction in a way that should encourage courts to determine that anti-beg-
ging laws are content-based restrictions subject to strict scrutiny.189  Thus, in 
the wake of Reed, courts should no longer defer to the government’s “benign 
motive[s],”190 such as the invocation of public health or safety.  Instead, 
courts should more aggressively scrutinize such rationales for evidence of 
pretext for discrimination against visibly poor people.191 
The increasing prevalence of anti-begging laws is a helpful example of 
how unconscious biases against poor people and deep-rooted associations be-
tween visible poverty and danger can become manifest in the law.  Post-Reed, 
we shall see if First Amendment jurisprudence—with its expressed interest 
in protecting diversity and difference—adequately addresses one indicium of 
the influence of exile, at least in the limited context of anti-begging laws.192 
But even if the judiciary were to adequately protect certain First Amend-
ment rights of visibly poor people, city governments appear unrelenting in 
their efforts to abridge such rights.193  As these laws multiply at a viral rate, 
access to justice issues—which are particularly pronounced for homeless and 
visibly poor people—compound the problem.194  Without adequate means to 
challenge these popular restrictions in court, visibly poor people are likely to 
remain First Amendment “constitutional castaways.”195 
                                                          
 186.  NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 21 (noting that “[i]n the absence of employment op-
portunities or when homeless people are unable to access needed public benefits, panhandling may 
be a person’s only option for obtaining money”). 
 187.  See Mead, supra note 173, at 57–59. 
 188.  135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 189.  Id. at 2227, 2230; see Mead, supra note 173, at 61 (discussing and quoting Reed).  
 190.  See Mead, supra note 173, at 61.  
 191.  Courts most clearly scrutinize for pretext in the context of Title VII employment discrimi-
nation cases.  See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Ap-
proach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).  But 
at least the Seventh Circuit has already responded to Reed, applying strict scrutiny and reversing an 
anti-begging law previously upheld as constitutional.  Norton, 768 F.3d at 717. 
 192.  For a sanguine perspective on Reed’s potential impact on begging restrictions, see Anthony 
Lauriello, Note, Panhandling Regulation After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 1105 
(2016). 
 193.  See NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15.  
 194.  See supra note 24.  
 195.  Millich, supra note 172.  
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C.  The “Death of Public Space” 
Political and legal theories aside, public space—and its appetite for di-
versity, difference, and social growth—is a quickly shrinking resource.196  
Economic theories commonly frame public space as a type of public good, 
“a resource that individuals cannot be prevented from consuming (i.e. non-
excludable) and for which one individual’s consumption does not diminish 
its potential consumption by others (i.e. non-rivalrous).”197  But when the re-
source of public space becomes overcrowded or in high demand, it becomes 
less “public” and more “privatized”: 
To manage the congestion, an organisation charged with maintain-
ing the space introduces regulations to restrict its use, thereby re-
ducing consumption rivalries but also making the space more ex-
clusive.  As these regulations are incrementally expanded, 
assigning control over specific parts to certain individuals or 
groups, the public space takes on the character of a partly or com-
pletely private space.198 
Thus, public space can also be understood in contrast to privatized 
space, which is distinguished by more exclusive degrees of access.  In this 
context, access refers not only to physical access or entry into the space, but 
also to social accessibility—the accessibility of activities, information, and 
resources in the space.199 
Government actors are not the only, or even the most influential, regu-
lators of public space.  Over the last century, the financing of public space 
has shifted from state and public expenditures to private developers.200  Busi-
ness improvement districts and other “public-private partnerships” continue 
to assume increasingly important roles in the financing and governance of 
public space.201  As a result, public space is increasingly privatized.202 
By the 1990s, the increasing privatization of public space prompted 
teams of interdisciplinary scholars to sound alarms predicting the “death of 
public space.”  Such critics contended that the traditional purpose of public 
space as a center for social and political diversity was giving way to more 
                                                          
 196.  See generally KOHN, supra note 83; Alex Glyman, SEATTLE UNIV. HOMELESS RIGHTS 
ADVOCACY PROJECT, Blurred Lines: Homelessness and The Increasing Privatization of Public 
Space (Sara K. Rankin ed., 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2776876. 
 197.  See Neal, supra note 98, at 60 (citing Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Ex-
penditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387 (1954)). 
 198.  Neal, supra note 98, at 60. 
 199.  See PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE (Stanley Benn & Gerald Gaus eds., 1983); see 
also KOHN, supra note 83, at 1–14. 
 200.  Neal, supra note 98, at 61, 63 (citing studies and noting the influence of zoning laws on 
the privatization of public space). 
 201. Id. at 60; Glyman, supra note 196, at i. 
 202.  See generally Glyman, supra note 196; KOHN, supra note 83.  
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contemporary promotions of consumerism.203  This focus on consumerism 
seeks to purge indicia of diversity from urban centers, in favor of a new, san-
itized, and commercialized space that caters to middle and upper-classes.204  
The economic concept of competing for slices of the “fixed pie” of public 
space is particularly acute in the context of gentrification, which is “an es-
sentially economic process of increasing land values but with wide-ranging 
social consequences.”205 
Contemporary conceptions of public space focus on leisure and foster-
ing fraternity with like-minded individuals, but such expectations trend to-
ward homogeneity and the exclusion of indicia of difference in order to create 
a relaxed, social atmosphere.206  Public space then serves as a vehicle for 
socioeconomic and class conformity,207 referring to expectations about and 
enforcement of identities, actions, and appearances that are “normal” and ac-
ceptable.208  In this sense, public space should uphold a mirror of sameness, 
or at least, similarity.  Deeming public space as a normative space not only 
contradicts the traditional hallmarks of “diversity and grittiness that the pub-
lic entails,” but also inevitably moves toward the expulsion of such diversity 
and grittiness—visibly poor people and associated evidence of human suffer-
ing—as sources of tension that contradict the desired public stage of socia-
bility, consumerism, and relaxed entertainment.209 
Today’s sprawling shopping malls exemplify the hybridization of pri-
vate and public space.  The U.S. Supreme Court confronted the issue in 
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins,210 where the Court found that a shop-
                                                          
 203.  Many urban studies scholars refer to this process of the privatization of public space as 
“festivalization.”  See, e.g., Andrew Smith, ‘Borrowing’ Public Space to Stage Major Events: The 
Greenwich Park Controversy, 51 URB. STUD. 247, 247 (2014); Sally Weller, Consuming the City: 
Public Fashion Festivals and the Participatory Economies of Urban Spaces in Melbourne, Aus-
tralia, 50 URB. STUD. 2853 (2013).  One particularly well-known critique of the privatization of 
public space is from Michael Sorkin’s edited collection, Introduction: Variations on a Theme Park, 
in VARIATIONS ON A THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE END OF PUBLIC SPACE xi 
(Sorkin ed., 1992) (concluding that urban centers were converting to theme parks). 
 204.  BECKETT & HERBERT, supra note 40, at 21.  “[M]any simply do not wish to see those who 
appear disorderly or who otherwise inspire trepidation.  Nor is it pleasant to be reminded of the 
deprivations associated with homelessness, severe poverty, addiction, or mental illness.”  Id.  
 205.  Neal, supra note 98, at 63; see also KOHN, supra note 83, at 8 (noting “[t]he privatization 
of public space exacerbates the effects of racial and class segregation that already exists in housing 
patterns”). 
 206.  See Bodnar, supra note 98, at 2097 (“The dialectics of community building is such that 
accepting members comes at the cost of excluding others.”). 
 207.  Sylvestre, supra note 94, at 365 (noting “marginality corresponds, both historically and in 
the present, to certain empowered groups’ interests related to the preservation of a certain social and 
economic order”). 
 208.  Gabrielle Pollini, Elements of a Theory of Place Attachment and Socio-Territorial Belong-
ing, 15 INT’L REV. SOC. 497–502 (2005). 
 209.  Bodnar, supra note 98, at 2097.   
 210.  447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
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ping mall, unlike a conventional private space, issues an invitation to the gen-
eral public and, therefore, opens itself up to certain regulations. Many subse-
quent decisions seized on this notion of shopping malls as the new, quintes-
sential quasi-public space, reasoning that the traditional town centers—
historically public sites for socializing and democratization—no longer exist 
in most contemporary areas.  Accordingly, the shopping mall was emerging 
as the new, contemporary heart of public space.211 
But, shopping malls are not ideals of public space: they remain funda-
mentally private spaces with commercial interests, corporate governance, and 
private security guards.212  Private businesses exist for one primary purpose: 
to spur and feed consumerism.  A key component of this process is to offer a 
controlled, sanitized, comfortable space that purges “troubled urbanity of its 
sting, of the presence of the poor, of crime, of dirt, of work.”213 
The macrocosm of the shopping mall is the downtown area.  Thus, a 
popular belief among private businesses, particularly coordinated businesses 
such as downtown business improvement districts (“BIDs”), is that in order 
to maximize profits, they must remove any physical evidence that undercuts 
the desire to spend money.  BIDs demonstrate the blurring of government 
and private action: First, BIDs heavily influence the lawmaking process, in-
cluding the enactment of laws regulating public space.214  Second, BIDs often 
assume quasi-governmental roles, such as “deputizing private citizens to po-
lice downtown areas.”215  When private business interests reign over the gov-
ernance of public space, visibly poor people are often negatively impacted.216  
The increasing visibility of poor and homeless people in urban centers pro-
vokes significant backlash, especially from businesses.217  City officials and 
                                                          
 211.  See Mark C. Alexander, Attention, Shoppers: The First Amendment in the Modern Shop-
ping Mall, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 1 (1999). 
 212.  Bodnar, supra note 98, at 2097. 
 213.  Sorkin, supra note 203, at xv. 
 214.  Glyman, supra note 196 at i; Memorandum from the Berkeley Policy Advocacy Clinic on 
BIDs Enabling Legislation to Paul Boden, Western Regional Advocacy Project (Oct. 29, 2015) (on 
file with the author) [hereinafter Berkeley Policy Advocacy Clinic].  Some may agree that the 
“death” or privatization of public space coincides with the “death” or privatization of democracy.  
Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page drew data from over 1,800 different policy initiatives from 1981 
to 2002 and concluded that rich, well-connected individuals steer American politics, regardless of 
or even contrary to the will of the majority of voters.  See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing 
Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 
564 (2014) (noting that “economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have 
substantial, independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while mass-based interest groups and 
average citizens have little or no independent influence”). 
 215.  Glyman, supra note 196, at i. 
 216.  Id.; Berkeley Policy Advocacy Clinic, supra note 214. 
 217.  DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC 
SPACE (2003); see also Schweik, supra note 72, at 5 (noting “[m]ost of the current spatial policies 
and practices that do the work of old unsightly beggar ordinances route primarily through the mech-
anisms of rampant privatization and private control of ‘securescapes’ in the city” (citing BECKETT 
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businesses face pressure to create cosmetically attractive downtown areas 
that will attract shoppers and tourists.218  Indeed, surveys consistently show 
that visibly poor people report more frequent harassment from private secu-
rity or BID ambassador-type authority figures than from police officers.219 
Thus, the increasing privatization of public space frustrates socio-polit-
ical ideals of democracy and difference.220  It reinforces the power to exclude 
and control marginalized groups as fundamental to property laws and poli-
cies.221  As further explained below, over the past twenty years, the combi-
nation of economic conditions, broken window ideologies, and the human 
drive to exile created a perfect storm for the increasing enactment of laws 
that purge signs of visible poverty from public space.222 
III.  THE CRIMINALIZATION OF VISIBLY POOR PEOPLE: WHERE PUBLIC 
SPACE AND THE INFLUENCE OF EXILE COLLIDE 
The wealthy working people have earned their right to live in the 
city.  They went out, got an education, work hard, and earned 
it . . . .  I shouldn’t have to see the pain, struggle, and despair of 
homeless people to and from my way to work every day.223 
Is being visibly poor a crime?  Should it be?  Consider, for a moment, 
how you would live your life—perform the daily activities you must every 
day, such as sleeping, eating, drinking, sitting, resting, or even going to the 
bathroom—if you were forced to live each moment in public.  Without resort 
to shelter, could you perform any of these necessary, life-sustaining activities 
                                                          
& HERBERT, supra note 40 (discussing privatization)); Lawrence Vale, Securing Public Space 
[Awards Jury Commentaries], 17 PLACES 33 (2005) (discussing securescapes)).   
 218.  MITCHELL, supra note 217. 
 219.  CHRIS HERRING, TONY SPARKS & DILARA YARBOUGH, COAL. ON HOMLESSNESS, 
PUNISHING THE POOREST: HOW THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS PERPETUATES 
POVERTY IN SAN FRANCISCO (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2620426; NAT’L COAL. FOR THE 
HOMELESS, DISCRIMINATION AND ECONOMIC PROFILING AMONG THE HOMELESS OF 
WASHINGTON, DC (Apr. 2014), http://nationalhomeless.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Discrim-
inationReport20141.pdf; TONY ROBINSON & ALLISON SICKELS, NO RIGHT TO REST: 
CRIMINALIZING HOMELESSNESS IN COLORADO (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.cpr.org/sites/de-
fault/files/homelessness-study.pdf. 
 220.  KOHN, supra note 83; see also, Garnett, supra note 122, at 1–14 (describing the persistence 
of broken windows theory in public zoning regulations). 
 221.  See supra Part II.B.1; see also Kevin Francis O’Neill, Privatizing Public Forums to Elim-
inate Dissent, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 201, 202 (2007) (noting “the increasing obsolescence of 
traditional public forums as a meaningful platform for citizen speech; and . . . the broad range of 
governmental efforts to eliminate or privatize our traditional public forums”). 
 222. FISHER ET AL, supra note 17; NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 219; Olson & 
MacDonald, supra note 15. 
 223.  Open letter from Justin Keller, entrepreneur, developer and the founder of startup Com-
mando.io, to San Francisco mayor, Ed Lee, and police chief, Greg Suhr (Feb. 15, 2015), 
http://justink.svbtle.com/open-letter-to-mayor-ed-lee-and-greg-suhr-police-chief. 
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for hours, days, weeks, or years without offending or upsetting another per-
son who observes you doing these things in public?  In fact, a significant 
number of jurisdictions nationwide criminalize such conduct,224 even if (and, 
as this Article suggests, especially because) you have no reasonable alterna-
tive due to lack of shelter. 
For hundreds of years, the United States and other countries have used 
laws and policies—purporting to protect public order—to move undesirable 
people from sight and control access to public space.225  These laws are often 
called “criminalization laws” because they prohibit or severely restrict the 
ability of certain marginalized groups to exist in public space.226  Jim Crow, 
Ugly laws, and Sundown Town laws are a few notorious examples of histor-
ical laws that criminalized the presence of people of color, disabled people, 
and immigrants in public space.227  Criminalization laws thus function as a 
form of banishment.228  Americans have since repealed these historical laws 
as discriminatory, but many contemporary ordinances—similar in form and 
function— are new hosts for the persistent influence of exile.229 
A.  The Contemporary Rise of Visible Poverty 
The steady growth in the popularity of these laws correlates with the 
steady increase in the number of visibly poor people throughout the country.  
A 2016 report shows that, compared with peer countries, the United States 
has the worst overall ranking on key poverty and inequality indicators.230  
                                                          
 224.  NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15. 
 225.  Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3.  For more on the history of regulating the presence of the poor, 
see, for example, William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the Original Thirteen States, 
31 U. RICH. L. REV. 111 (1997); William P. Quigley, Five Hundred Years of English Poor Laws, 
1349–1834: Regulating the Working and Nonworking Poor, 30 AKRON L. REV. 73 (1996); William 
P. Quigley, Work or Starve: Regulation of the Poor in Colonial America, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 35 
(1996). 
 226.  See, e.g., BECKETT & HERBERT, supra note 40; NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 18 
(defining the criminalization of homelessness as prohibitions on “life-sustaining activities” that are 
performed in public); Farida Ali, Limiting the Poor’s Right to Public Space: Criminalizing Home-
lessness in California, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 197 (2004); Maria Foscarinis, Down-
ward Spiral: Homelessness and Its Criminalization, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (1996); John B. 
Mitchell, Crimes of Misery and Theories of Punishment, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 465 (2012); Olson 
& MacDonald, supra note 15; Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 3; Waldron, supra note 83; Paul Ades, 
Note, The Unconstitutionality of “AntiHomeless” Law: Ordinances Prohibiting Sleeping in Out-
door Areas as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (1989); Antonia Fasanelli, 
Note, In re Eichorn: The Long Awaited Implementation of the Necessity Defense in a Case of the 
Criminalization of Homelessness, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 323 (2000).   
 227.  Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3. 
 228.  BECKETT & HERBERT, supra note 40. 
 229.  Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3. 
 230.  DAVID GRUSKY ET. AL, PATHWAYS, STATE OF THE UNION: THE POVERTY AND 
INEQUALITY REPORT (2016), http://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Pathways-SOTU-
2016-2.pdf.  
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Homelessness is a significant crisis nationwide.  At least 600,000 people ex-
perience homelessness on any given night, including over 200,000 people in 
families.231  Nearly 3.5 million Americans will experience homelessness this 
year alone.232  In 2013, “an estimated 2.5 million children lived in run-down 
motels, cars and shelters, on friends’ and relatives’ couches and on the 
streets.”233  According to the latest U.S. Conference of Mayor’s report, the 
number of homeless people in nineteen major cities increased over the last 
year by an average of 1.6%, with 58% of surveyed cities reporting in-
creases.234  Major cities such as Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle have re-
cently declared homelessness as a state of emergency.235 
But the problem has not always been this bad.  Many agree that free 
market theories, supply side economics, and anti-welfare ideologies in the 
1980s fueled the swell of contemporary homelessness.236  The 1980s ushered 
                                                          
 231.  MEGHAN HENRY ET. AL, THE 2015 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT (AHAR) 
TO CONGRESS (Nov. 2015), https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2015-AHAR-
Part-1.pdf.  These “point in time” numbers are roundly criticized as underestimations.  See, e.g., 
Paul Boden, Homeless Head Counts Help No One, S.F. GATE (Feb. 5, 2013, 7:26 PM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Homeless-head-counts-help-no-one-
4254191.php (“Point-in-time counts are a minimum number, always. They undercount hidden 
homeless populations because homeless persons are doubling up with the housed or cannot be iden-
tified by sight as homeless.”).  
 232.  NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, HOW MANY PEOPLE EXPERIENCE HOMELESSNESS? 3 
(Aug. 2007), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/facts/How_Many.pdf; NAT’L ALL. TO 
END HOMELESSNESS, THE STATE OF HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.en-
dhomelessness.org/library/entry/the-state-of-homelessness-in-america-2015. 
 233.  Joe Mozingo, No Room at the Inn for Innocence, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2015), 
graphics.latimes.com/san-bernardino-motel (discussing Jon Queally, Study: More Homeless Chil-
dren Now Than Any Point in U.S. History, COMMON DREAMS (Nov. 17, 2014)). The number of 
homeless students in the United States recently reached a record national total of 1.36 million in the 
2013–14 school year.  Lyndsey Layton & Emma Brown, Number of Homeless Students in U.S. Has 
Doubled Since Before the Recession, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2015), https://goo.gl/8BDTZC (noting 
“student homelessness has risen steadily since 2009, continuing to rise even after the U.S. unem-
ployment rate began falling and much of the country began recovering from the recession and the 
housing crash that helped cause it”).  City officials commonly identify the leading cause of home-
lessness among families as the lack of affordable housing, followed by poverty, unemployment, and 
low-paying jobs. THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS 
SURVEY: A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 2 (Dec. 
2015). 
 234.  THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 233, at 2.  Although approxi-
mately 42% of cities reported decreases over last year, during the same time period, emergency food 
assistance requests rose by an average of 2.8% in more than half of surveyed cities.  Fifty percent 
of surveyed cities expected homelessness to rise “moderately” next year and 65% of cities expected 
emergency food requests to “moderately” increase over the same time period.  Id. at 1–2.  Twenty-
three percent of requests for emergency food assistance in the cities surveyed went unmet.  Id. at 1. 
 235.  J.B. Wogan, Why Governments Declare a Homeless State of Emergency, GOVERNING THE 
STATES AND LOCALITIES (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-ser-
vices/gov-when-cities-declare-a-homeless-state-of-emergency.html. 
 236.  VINCENT LYON-CALLO, INEQUALITY, POVERTY, AND NEOLIBERAL GOVERNANCE: 
ACTIVIST ETHNOGRAPHY IN THE HOMELESS SHELTERING INDUSTRY (2004); W. REG’L 
ADVOCACY PROJECT, THE SYSTEMIC INADEQUACY OF BUSH’S HOMELESSNESS POLICY (2011).  
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in a devastating trifecta: First, Congress decimated funding for public hous-
ing construction and subsidization programs and they have never regained 
their prior strength.237  Second, Congress severely undercut important mental 
health programs, such as community mental health centers that were sup-
posed to replace mental hospitals after deinstitutionalization.238  Third, social 
welfare cuts blazed an unprecedented path to deeper poverty and homeless-
ness for hundreds of thousands of people.239 
Today, the majority of homeless people are forced to live in public.  Vir-
tually every major city lacks sufficient shelter to accommodate local home-
less men, women, and children.240  This lack of shelter, combined with a 
dearth of affordable housing,241 especially in aftershocks of the most recent 
recession, means that several hundreds of thousands of Americans have no 
reasonable alternative but to live in public spaces.242 
                                                          
 237.  CUSHING DOLBEARE, IRENE SARAF & SHEILA CROWLEY, CHANGING PRIORITIES: THE 
FEDERAL BUDGET AND HOUSING ASSISTANCE 1976–2005 (2004). 
 238.  Deinstutionalization refers to the release of large populations of mentally-disabled individ-
uals who lacked stable residency upon discharge from mental institutions.  See MICHAEL J. DEAR 
& JENNIFER R. WOLCH, LANDSCAPES OF DESPAIR: FROM DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION TO 
HOMELESSNESS (1987);  David Cutler et al., Four Decades of Community Mental Health: A Sym-
phony in Four Movements, 39 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 381 (2003); E.K. Sherl & A.D. 
Schmetzer, Community Mental Health Centers Emergency Services in the 1980’s: Effects of Fund-
ing Changes, 25 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 267 (1989). 
 239.  DEAR & WOLCH, supra note 238. 
 240.  THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 233, at 2 (“Because no beds 
were available for them, emergency shelters in 76 percent of the survey cities had to turn away 
homeless families with children experiencing homelessness.  Shelters in 61 percent of the cities had 
to turn away unaccompanied individuals.”); NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 232, at 
2 (noting that “a study of homelessness in 50 cities found that in virtually every city, the city’s 
official estimated number of homeless people greatly exceeded the number of emergency shelter 
and transitional housing spaces”). 
 241.  The number of households in America who must devote more than fifty percent of their 
income to rent will rise eleven percent by 2025.  ANDREW JAKABOVICS ET. AL, PROJECTING 
TRENDS IN SEVERELY COST-BURDENED RENTERS: 2015–2025, at 4 (2015).  Housing cost-burdened 
renters will rise from 11.8 million to 13.1 million.  Id.  “The nationwide lack of sufficient affordable 
housing for poor households is well documented.”  JOSH LEOPOLD ET AL., THE HOUSING 
AFFORDABILITY GAP FOR EXTREMELY LOW-INCOME RENTERS IN 2013, at 2 (2015) (reviewing 
available data and further examining “the affordability crisis” for extremely-low income renters); 
see also NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL. STUDY, OUT OF REACH (2015) (concluding there is no 
place in the U.S. where “an individual working a typical 40-hour workweek at the federal minimum 
wage [can] afford a one- or two-bedroom apartment for his or her family”). 
 242.  NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: ADVOCACY MANUAL 
14, https://www.nlchp.org/documents/No_Safe_Place_Advocacy_Manual (“Because many munic-
ipalities do not have adequate shelter space, homeless persons are often left with no alternative but 
to sleep and live in public spaces.”). 
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B.  Criminalization as a Response to the Crisis of Visible Poverty 
As the gap between the rich and the poor continues to widen,243 laws 
that prohibit or severely restrict the presence of visibly poor people also con-
tinue to increase and intensify across the nation.244  Several studies detail the 
extensive scope of the criminalization of homeless and visibly poor people, 
so a detailed examination is not necessary here.245  But generally, the crimi-
nalization of visible poverty refers to measures that restrict life-sustaining 
activities such as sleeping, camping, eating, sitting, seeking income, asking 
for help, urinating, defecating, receiving food, storing belongings, or protect-
ing oneself from the elements in public spaces—even when a person has no 
reasonable alternative due to a lack of shelter or private space.246  Citywide 
bans on such life-sustaining activities, combined with the increasing privati-
zation of public space, means that the spaces in which visibly poor people are 
permitted to legally exist are becoming smaller and smaller.  Consequently, 
visibly poor people are increasingly forced out of entire communities or they 
face the threat of fines, arrest, or criminal penalties for engaging in acts nec-
essary to survive.247 
The defining feature of criminalization is the use of policing and the 
criminal justice system as a first resort for responding to the public presence 
                                                          
 243.  COLIN GORDON, GROWING APART: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN INEQUALITY 
(2014), http://scalar.usc.edu/works/growing-apart-a-political-history-of-american-inequality/index 
(“Inequality is greater now than it has been at any time in the last century, and the gaps in wages, 
income, and wealth are wider here than they are in any other democratic and developed economy.”); 
see also Richard Fry & Rakesh Kochhar, America’s Wealth Gap Between Middle-Income and Up-
per-Income Families Is Widest on Record, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 17, 2014), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/17/wealth-gap-upper-middle-income/ (noting 
“[t]he wealth gap between America’s high income group and everyone else has reached record high 
levels since the economic recovery from the Great Recession of 2007–09”).  
 244.  See FISHER ET AL., supra note 17; NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15; Olson & MacDonald, 
supra note 15. 
 245.  See BECKETT & HERBERT, supra note 40; FISHER ET AL., supra note 17; RACHEL A. 
ADCOCK ET AL., TOO HIGH A PRICE: WHAT CRIMINALIZING HOMELESSNESS COSTS COLORADO 
(2016), http://www.law.du.edu/documents/homeless-advocacy-policy-project/2-16-16-Final-Re-
port.pdf; NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15; Ali, supra note 226; Foscarinis, supra note 226; Mitchell, 
supra note 226; Olson & MacDonald, supra note 15; Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 3, at 1; Wal-
dron, supra note 83; Ades, supra note 226; Fasanelli, supra note 226. 
 246.  See, e.g., NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15; Olson & MacDonald, supra note 15; BECKETT 
& HERBERT, supra note 40. 
 247.  See, e.g., NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15; Olson & MacDonald, supra note 15; BECKETT 
& HERBERT, supra note 40.  Violations can result in criminal charges or steep fines that poor people 
inevitably are unable to pay.  Unpaid fines often evolve into misdemeanor failure to pay or respond 
to charges.  See generally KATHERINE BECKETT ET AL., THE ASSESSMENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS IN WASHINGTON STATE (2008); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF 
WASHINGTON & COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES, MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS: THE WAYS 
COURT-IMPOSED DEBTS PUNISH PEOPLE FOR BEING POOR (2014), https://aclu-wa.org/sites/de-
fault/files/attachments/Modern%20Day%20Debtor's%20Prison%20Final%20(3).pdf.  
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of visibly poor and homeless people.248  Because homeless people exist in 
public space, the experience of homelessness itself makes interactions with 
law enforcement more likely, especially the likelihood of being ticketed or 
arrested.249  Enforcement-based approaches present risks to the well-being 
and safety of homeless people by excluding them from safe spaces, fracturing 
existing relationships with other people or services, or pushing them towards 
more dangerous activities.250  Enforcement-based responses are also an ex-
pensive, resource-intensive use of police resources,251 and police officers are 
not always equipped to deal with the complex health and social problems 
bound up in the experience of homelessness.252 
Dragging visibly poor people through the criminal justice system for 
engaging in necessary, life-sustaining conduct does nothing to address the 
underlying conditions that encourage homelessness and poverty.  Instead, 
criminalization exacerbates poverty and homelessness.  The imposition of a 
criminal history or insurmountable legal financial obligations severely di-
minishes a person’s chances of accessing employment, housing, and public 
benefits.253  Accordingly, laws criminalizing homelessness create an expen-
sive revolving door, continually worsening conditions for poor people and 
draining cities’ fiscal resources.254  Indeed, studies consistently show that en-
forcement of criminalization laws is more expensive and less effective than 
non-punitive alternatives, such as the provision of affordable housing, mental 
health services, or substance abuse treatment.255 
Cities frequently invoke public safety and health concerns—much of the 
same justifications for historical laws such as Jim Crow—in defense of crim-
inalizing visibly poor people.256  But studies do not support the proposition 
that the criminalization of visible poverty does anything to advance public 
                                                          
 248.  See, e.g., BILL O’GRADY ET AL., CAN I SEE YOUR ID?: THE POLICING OF YOUTH 
HOMELESSNESS IN TORONTO (2011), http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/CanI-
SeeYourID_nov9.pdf.  
 249.  Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 3, at 1, 16 (discussing Canadian studies). 
 250.  HERRING & YARBOUGH, supra note 219; FISHER ET AL., supra note 17. 
 251.  Howard & Tran, supra note 16, at 6; Jeffrey Selbin et al., BERKELEY LAW POLICY 
ADVOCACY CLINIC, DOES SIT-LIE WORK: WILL BERKELEY’S “MEASURE S” INCREASE ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY AND IMPROVE SERVICES TO HOMELESS PEOPLE? (2012); Adcock et al., supra note 245, 
at 2. 
 252.  See, e.g., Charles Gary, How to Police the Homeless, POLICE MAG. (June 1, 2004), 
http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2004/06/how-to-police-the-homeless.aspx; Liza 
Lucas, Changing the Way Police Respond to Mental Illness, CNN (July 6, 2015, 3:51 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/06/health/police-mental-health-training/. 
 253.  NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 32–33. 
 254.  Id. at 30.   
 255.  Howard & Tran, supra note 16, at 24 (surveying national and statewide studies showing 
the enforcement of criminalization laws is more expensive than the provision of non-punitive alter-
natives that better address the problems of homelessness). 
 256.  NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 12; Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3, at 27. 
RankinFinalBookProof 10/31/2016  12:22 PM 
46 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:4 
health and safety.257  Another frequent justification is economic stimulation, 
however, no study shows a correlation between purging visible poverty and 
an increase in the bottom line of area businesses; indeed, at least one study 
proves there is no such relationship.258  Studies also disprove the argument 
that criminalization actually helps poor people by engaging them with ser-
vices.259  To the contrary, people experiencing homelessness often report ex-
treme psychological and emotional trauma from constant societal rejection 
and criminalization.260 
C.  The Persistence of Criminalizing Visible Poverty 
Given such overwhelming evidence that criminalization is bad law and 
policy, why are these measures increasingly enacted and aggressively en-
forced?  The simple answer is the influence of exile.  Society’s negative 
views of poverty appear to drive some of these differences, both in terms of 
the pronounced stigmatization of visibly poor people and in terms of the 
law’s lack of responsiveness.261 
In addition to social science suggesting that visibly poor people bear the 
brunt of stigma against poor people generally,262 “popular culture abounds 
with examples of glorified violence against the homeless and anti-homeless 
sentiment.”263  Visibly poor people are frequent victims of hate crimes264 and 
common victims of police harassment and brutality.265 
                                                          
 257.  See BLASI, supra note 91; HARCOURT, supra note 91; HERBERT, supra note 92; Fagan & 
Davies, supra note 93. 
 258.  Selbin et al., supra note 251, at 3. 
 259.  Id.; see also Herring & Yarbough, supra note 219, at 47; RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., THE 
VERA INSTITUTE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA (2015), 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/incarcerations-front-door-report.pdf. 
 260.  TAI DUNSON-STRANE & SARAH SOAKAI, DEP’T OF URBAN AND REG’L PLANNING UNIV. 
OF HAWAII AT MANOA, THE EFFECTS OF CITY SWEEPS AND SIT-LIE POLICIES ON HONOLULU’S 
HOUSELESS (2015), http://blog.hawaii.edu/durp/files/2015/06/Houseless-Honolulu-Re-
port.small_.pdf; NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 232, at 25.  
 261.  See supra Part I (explaining negative views of poverty).  
 262.  See supra Part I.  
 263.  Rankin, supra note 64, at 391 (reviewing examples). 
 264.  NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, VULNERABLE TO HATE: A SURVEY OF HATE CRIMES 
AND VIOLENCE COMMITTED AGAINST HOMELESS PEOPLE IN 2013 (Michael Stoops ed., June 2014), 
http://nationalhomeless.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Hate-Crimes-2013-FINAL.pdf.   
 265.  See, e.g., Elliot Spagat, Video Released of San Diego Officer’s Shooting of Transient, MSN 
NEWS (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/video-released-of-san-diego-officers-
shooting-of-transient/ar-BBnQNYC; Alan Pyke, Phoenix Cops Could Face Felony Charges For 
Pepper Spraying a Homeless Woman and Lying About It, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 14, 2015, 3:07 
PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2015/12/14/3731777/phoenix-police-charged-lying/; Fer-
nanda Santos, New Mexico: Officers to be Tried for Man’s Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/19/us/new-mexico-officers-to-be-tried-for-mans-kill-
ing.html?_r=0; Tobias Salinger, Florida Cop Shown Tossing Peanuts at Homeless Man, Laughing 
with Deputies as Man Eats them Off Floor in Booking Video, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 27, 2015, 
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Of course, evidence of societal hostility toward visible poverty does not 
always manifest in violent ways.  Many extra-legal efforts seek displacement 
of visible poverty.  Some urban design techniques have been described as 
“weapons” that are used by “architects, planners, policy-makers, developers, 
real estate brokers, community activists, neighborhood associations, and in-
dividuals to wage the ongoing war between integration and segregation.”266  
Such techniques are commonly dubbed as the practice of “hostile” or “disci-
plinary” architecture, which uses design as a mechanism to reduce the pres-
ence of homeless people in urban centers.267  Recent examples include the 
installation of spikes on ledges or behind doorways,268 sprinklers triggered 
by evening movement on the steps of church entryways,269 multiple armrests 
to divide sidewalk benches,270 and enormous jagged boulders on grassy me-
dians.271  The use of hostile architecture often generates controversy, not just 
because of its transparency, but sometimes because of its economic cost.  Op-
ponents point out, for example, that the finances spent to support hostile ar-
chitecture could be redirected to support those in need instead of exclude 
them.272  Similarly, some cities heavily invest in “one way” transportation 
                                                          
9:43 PM), http://a.msn.com/01/en-us/AAdzIOe?ocid=se; Robert Gebelhoff, A New York Police Un-
ion Asks Members to Take Photos of City’s Homeless, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/08/11/a-new-york-police-union-
asks-members-to-take-photos-of-citys-homeless/. 
 266.  Daniel D’Oca et al., The Arsenal of Inclusion and Exclusion, 17 MAS CONTEXT 54 (2013), 
http://www.mascontext.com/issues/17-boundary-spring-13/the-arsenal-of-inclusion-and-exclu-
sion/; see also Eric Jaffee, The Hidden Ways Urban Design Segregates the Poor, FAST CODE 
DESIGN COMPANY (Aug. 12, 2014, 8:00 AM), www.fastcodesign/3034206/slicker-city/the-hidden-
ways-urban-design-segregates-the-poor.  
 267.  See, e.g., Eric Jaffee, supra note 266; see also, Sara Schindler, Architectural Exclusion: 
Discrimination and Segregation Through Physical Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J. 
1934 (2015). 
 268.  Alex Andreou, Spikes Keep the Homeless Away, Pushing Them Further out of Sight, 
GUARDIAN (June 9, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/09/spikes-home-
less-london-metal-alcove-defensive-architecture-poverty; Deborah Hastings, Posh London Apart-
ment Complex Puts Up Metal Spikes to Deter Homeless, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 7, 2014), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/posh-london-building-puts-spikes-homeless-article-
1.1820898. 
 269.  Doug Sovern, Saint Mary’s Cathedral Drenches Homeless with Water, CBS S.F. (Mar. 18, 
2015, 5:30 AM), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2015/03/18/homeless-saint-marys-cathedral-
archdiocese-san-francisco-intentionally-drenched-water-sleeping/. 
 270.  Eric Jaffee, supra note 266. 
 271.  Matt Driscoll, Throwing Rocks at Tacoma’s Homeless Problem Isn’t the Answer, NEWS 
TRIB. (June 9, 2015), http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/matt-dris-
coll/article26298283.html. 
 272.  Mary Vorsino, Homeless Face New City Tactic: Bus Stop Stools, HONOLULU ADVERTISER 
(Oct. 27, 2008), http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2008/Oct/27/ln/ha waii810270333.html 
(“So far, the city has spent about $11,000 on the seating initiative, removing benches and installing 
55 stools at 12 bus stops in urban Honolulu and Kane’ohe. . . .  Michael Stoops . . . said cities should 
concentrate more on providing shelter and services for the homeless and less on moving them from 
bus stops.”); Alex Andreou, Anti-homeless Spikes: ‘Sleeping Rough Opened My Eyes to the City’s 
Barbed Cruelty’, GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/feb/18/ 
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programs, designed to “solve” the problem of visible poverty by literally 
shipping poor people elsewhere.273 
Despite clear evidence of the pervasive stigmatization and marginaliza-
tion of visibly poor and homeless people, equal protection analysis holds lit-
tle promise.274  Poverty, by itself, is not a suspect classification that triggers 
heightened judicial scrutiny.275  Other scholars have criticized the anemic 
quality of equal protection jurisprudence for failing to ensure meaningful pro-
tection, access, and opportunity for poor and marginalized members of soci-
ety.276 
Although advocates sometimes successfully challenge these laws as vi-
olating the human, civil, and constitutional rights of visibly poor people, they 
are often upheld despite evidence of their disproportionate impact on poor 
and homeless populations; populations that are, in turn, disproportionately 
comprised of other marginalized groups that are supposed to be afforded var-
ious legal protections.277  Courts frequently defer to governmental justifica-
tions such as public health and safety, without scrutinizing these justifications 
for pretext and without requiring evidence of how criminalization measures 
impact the health and safety of visibly poor people.278  In this permissive 
space, the influence of exile supports the proliferation of laws that criminalize 
people who have no reasonable alternative but to engage in necessary, life-
sustaining activities somewhere in public.279  Consequently, criminalization 
laws effectively punish people for experiencing homelessness.280 
                                                          
defensive-architecture-keeps-poverty-undeen-and-makes-us-more-hostile (noting that defensive or 
hostile architecture “doesn’t even achieve its basic goal of making us feel safer”).  
 273.  See, e.g., Eben Blake, Homeless Bus Ticket Programs Across the Nation Offer Little Ac-
countability, Poor Housing Solutions, Activists Say, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 24, 2015, 7:34 AM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/homeless-bus-ticket-programs-across-nation-offer-little-accountability-
poor-housing-2016812.  
 274.  See Nice, supra note 64.  
 275.  Harris v. McRae, for example, is commonly interpreted as Supreme Court precedent that 
poor people are not a suspect class.  448 U.S. 297 (1980).  However, other scholars persuasively 
argue that the Supreme Court has not clearly addressed the suspect classification status of poor 
people.  See Nice, supra note 64.   
 276.  See Nice, supra note 64; Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of An 
Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1720 (arguing for the “concept of 
the ‘vulnerable subject’ as a more viable and appropriate figure around which to build contemporary 
policy and law”). 
 277.  NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 7 (surveying various cases and outcomes); Lurie & 
Schuster, supra note 46 (establishing the disproportionate representation of other marginalized 
groups in homeless populations). 
 278.  See supra Part II.B. 
 279.  For more on the lack of reasonable alternatives for poor and homeless people, see Fasanelli, 
supra note 226. 
 280.  See NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15; Olson & MacDonald, supra note 15; Statement of 
Interest of the United States at 7, Bell v. Boise, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (D. Idaho 2014) (Civ. Action 
No. 1:09-cv-540-REB Hom.). 
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As long as cities fail to adequately address the underlying causes of 
homelessness, criminalization laws in those jurisdictions should be unconsti-
tutional under the Eighth Amendment.  The U.S. Supreme Court in Robinson 
v. California281 held that laws that criminalize an individual’s status, rather 
than specific conduct, are unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment.282  Moreover, “certain acts also may not be 
subject to punishment under the Eighth Amendment if they are unavoidable 
consequences of one’s status.”283 Thus, if a law prohibits conduct that is un-
avoidable or “involuntary due to one’s condition, criminalization of that con-
duct would be impermissible” under the constitutional prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment.284  For example, the Department of Justice 
recently clarified that conduct-versus-status analysis, which municipalities 
routinely rely upon to justify enforcement of ordinances that criminalize 
sleeping and camping in public, fails to pass Eighth Amendment muster when 
inadequate shelter beds leave homeless individuals with no choice but to 
sleep in public.285  This argument has found some limited success.286  But 
there is no principled basis for limiting the Eighth Amendment’s application 
to anti-camping laws; instead, this reasoning should apply to any criminali-
zation law that punishes conduct that is a “universal and unavoidable conse-
quence of being human” when that person has no reasonable alternative.287 
                                                          
 281. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 282.  Id. at 667 (holding that a state cannot punish a person for his or her status).   
 283.  Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 280, at 7.  The DOJ’s statement 
provides a cogent review and synthesis of Robinson, Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), and 
other relevant Eighth Amendment challenges to anti-camping ordinances that have been enforced 
against homeless individuals.  The DOJ ultimately urged the United States District Court for the 
District of Idaho to adopt the reasoning of Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 
2006), vacated after settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007), which found such ordinances un-
constitutional because, in the face of insufficient shelter within the city, the laws criminalized es-
sential, life-sustaining activities such as sitting, lying down, and sleeping even though homeless 
individuals had no reasonable alternative than to perform such activities in public.  Statement of 
Interest of the United States, supra note 280, at 11, (noting that “punishing conduct that is a ‘uni-
versal and unavoidable consequence [] of being human’ violates the Eighth Amendment” (quoting 
Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136)). 
 284.  Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 280, at 7. 
 285.  Id. at 11–14.  In evaluating the constitutionality of anti-camping ordinances, courts may 
consider the sufficiency of available shelter beds.  When there is an insufficient number of beds 
available to accommodate the local homeless population, courts may hold that a law criminalizing 
sleeping in public is void as applied to a homeless defendant.  See, e.g., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 
F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 2000) (upholding anti-camping ordinance because shelter beds available 
on the night the defendant was cited); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D. 
Fla. 1992) (holding in part, that enforcement of an anti-sleeping ordinance was cruel and unusual 
punishment when insufficient shelter beds); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1155 (Cal. 
1995) (upholding anti-camping ordinance in part because defendants failed to show whether shelter 
beds were available); In re Eichorn, 69 Cal. App. 4th 382, 385 (1998) (considering insufficiency of  
shelter beds in context of necessity defense).  
 286.  See supra note 280, at 11–14. 
 287.  Id. at 10 (quoting Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136); see also Fasanelli, supra note 226. 
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As explained in this Section, laws that criminalize essential life activi-
ties for individuals experiencing homelessness do not promote public safety, 
impose needless costs on prosecutorial, defense, and court services, and do 
nothing to solve the underlying problems of poverty, homelessness, and men-
tal illness.  Instead of wasting significant amounts of money on criminalizing 
visible poverty, governments should focus resources on non-punitive alter-
natives, such as providing housing and services.288  But, until the American 
conscience confronts the human instinct to exile visibly poor people from 
public space, criminalization laws and policies will persist and evolve. 
IV.  CONFRONTING THE INFLUENCE OF EXILE 
Despite Americans’ insistence on egalitarianism, opportunity, and 
classlessness, ‘there is an un-American secret at the heart of Amer-
ican culture: for a long time it was [and is] preoccupied by 
class’ . . . .  [W]e are acutely aware of class distinctions, and we 
endorse the opportunity syllogism, which suggests that people at-
tain the class status they deserve.  We deride elites as out of touch, 
but we do not notice that we are the elites of the world.289 
The influence of exile is an invisible hand, guiding the enactment and 
enforcement of laws that ensure and sustain inequalities to the advantage of 
the more powerful.290  Public perceptions about whether an individual “de-
serves” rights, in turn, affect how the law allocates or restricts rights.291  The 
unparalleled stigma reserved for the visibly poor explains not only the pro-
liferation of criminalization laws, but also the lack of urgency in legal and 
policy fixes. 
Policymakers must confront the influence of exile.  They should note 
consistent evidence that criminalization laws are ineffective and expensive 
when compared to non-punitive alternatives.  They should review their laws 
governing the use of public spaces and repeal any that express the influence 
of exile.  Additionally, jurisdictions that fail to adequately address the under-
lying causes of homelessness and visible poverty should desist from enforc-
ing laws that criminalize conduct in which people must engage to survive.  
                                                          
 288.  Howard & Tran, supra note 16 (surveying national and statewide studies showing the en-
forcement of criminalization laws is more expensive than the provision of non-punitive alternatives 
that better address the problems of homelessness). 
 289.  FISKE, supra note 12, at 26 (footnote omitted) (quoting Nick Krafft, Class in American 
Literature, OPEN ECONOMICS (Aug. 26, 2010), https://openeconomicsnd.wordpress.com 
/2010/08/26/class-in-american-literature/). 
 290.  See GREENWALD, supra note 24, at 7. 
 291.  See, e.g., Burnstein, supra note 3, at 29; Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 3; see also GEORGE 
ORWELL, Freedom of the Park, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM, AND LETTERS OF 
GEORGE ORWELL 40 (1968) (“If large numbers of people are interested in freedom of speech, there 
will be freedom of speech, even if the law forbids it; if public opinion is sluggish, inconvenient 
minorities will be persecuted, even if laws exist to protect them.”). 
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Even if policymakers deny these points and believe they can modify laws and 
policies to both reduce visible poverty and avoid potential constitutional lia-
bility, they should take steps to mitigate the total waste of taxpayer dollars 
caused by criminalizing behaviors that many poor people have no choice but 
to repeat. 
The judiciary must also better appreciate the influence of exile, particu-
larly in application to visibly poor people.  Courts should invalidate laws that 
criminalize the conduct of necessary, life-sustaining conduct in public when 
there is no reasonable alternative.292  Governmental justifications of public 
health and public safety should be scrutinized and evaluated not only from 
the perspective of privileged individuals, but also from the perspective of 
poor people who are forced to live in public.293 
But defending the visibility of poverty also plays a key role in confront-
ing the influence of exile.  Criminalization laws, by regulating and minimiz-
ing the visibility of poverty in public space, undermine the availability of 
public space as a venue to protest.  Persistent counter efforts must continue 
to organize and challenge the influence of exile, claiming public space as a 
venue for acts of civil disobedience and nonviolent political protest.294  “Pub-
lic space is inherently political and potentially subversive; it is seen as both 
the manifestation of reigning political power but also as that of a more inclu-
sive power that can reclaim it temporarily by occupying it for political pur-
poses.”295 
Indeed, in this context, the mere existence of homeless people in public 
space is an act of resistance.296  In Martin Luther King’s Letter from Birming-
ham Jail, Dr. King explained why visibility is key to protest: 
Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and establish 
such creative tension that a community that has constantly refused 
to negotiate is forced to confront the issue.  It seeks so to dramatize 
the issue that it can no longer be ignored . . . .  [T]he purpose of the 
direct action is to create a situation so crisis-packed that it will in-
evitably open the door to negotiation.297 
                                                          
 292.  See supra Part III (discussing criminalization laws). 
 293.  See supra Part II (discussing judicial deference in First Amendment cases) & Part III (dis-
cussing the same in criminalization cases generally). 
 294.  Bodnar, supra note 98, at 2100 (advocating for marginalized groups to “reclaim public 
space for uses that defy the dominant logic of the contemporary rearrangement of public space, and 
point to its countercurrents”). 
 295.  Id. at 2095. 
 296.  TALMADGE WRIGHT, OUT OF PLACE: HOMELESS MOBILIZATIONS, SUBCITIES, AND 
CONTESTED LANDSCAPES 182 (1997) (noting that, for marginalized populations, “[e]xistence is re-
sistance”). 
 297.  Letter from Martin Luther King Jr. to Bishop C. C. J. Carpenter et al. (Apr. 16, 1963) 
(generally known as the “Letter from a Birmingham Jail”). 
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Thus, it is only when society cannot hide evidence of poverty, inequal-
ity, underfunded mental health services, and the lack of affordable housing 
that society is forced to confront it.  In order to effectuate a meaningful shift 
in American laws and policies, the crisis of poverty must be visible in public 
space.298  The presence of visible poverty forces society to confront inequal-
ity of income, education, health care, and criminal justice. Although confron-
tation with visible poverty may make more privileged people feel uncomfort-
able or even frightened, this dissonance is an essential form of protest, a 
crucial method to influence public opinion and provoke social change.299  Im-
pact litigation and legislative advocacy are slow, unsure, and even expensive 
options; the visibility of people who are experiencing poverty and homeless-
ness is a necessary and primary form of resistance.300  The presence of visible 
poverty is a persistent message that can “scratch[] the psychological armor 
of even those citizens who insisted that all those people on the street were 
still the unworthy poor.”301 
The peaceful occupation of public space then becomes its own sort of 
tactical control that is both “adaptive and defiant.”302  Encampments and sim-
ilar “strategies enabl[e] individuals to weave together survival and in some 
cases social transformation”303; such forms of protest and resistance amount 
to “an attempt by the homeless to provide themselves with the shelter, com-
munity, and dignity denied them by their social system.”304  Fighting dis-
placement then creates a form of “insurgent citizenship, where those whose 
status as legitimate members of the public is not yet fully established, but 
where they nonetheless hold their ground and make claims of the legitimacy 
                                                          
 298.  Randall Amster & David Cook, Homelessness as Nonviolent Resistance 2009–2010, J. FOR 
THE STUDY OF PEACE & CONFLICT 13, 13–14 (2009–2010) (noting “[t]he issue of homelessness 
presents a unique moment in peace and social change praxis to unify both reactive survival aims 
with proactive policy shifts, since it is precisely the continued existence of homeless ‘street people’ 
that often seems to represent one of the greatest ‘threats’ to business as usual” (citing WRIGHT, 
supra note 296, at 182)).  
 299.  KOHN, supra note 83, at 184 (“If the homeless do not have the opportunity to be visible in 
public space, if they cannot communicate their needs, then there is no chance that they will convince 
others to make the social changes necessary to meet these needs.”); Don Mitchell, Introduction: 
Public Space in the City, 17 URB. GEOGRAPHY 127, 129 (1996) (“[D]issidents of all types must 
continually assert their presence into public space, if they ever are to be seen and heard.”). 
 300.  SUSAN RUDDICK, YOUNG AND HOMELESS IN HOLLYWOOD: MAPPING THE SOCIAL 
IDENTITIES 64 (1996) (noting that homeless people manifest a form of resistance “simply by their 
presence”); Don Mitchell, Political Violence, Order, and the Legal Construction of Public Space: 
Power and the Public Forum Doctrine, 17 URB. GEOGRAPHY 152, 172 (1996) (“[I]t is essential that 
activists continue to challenge restrictive rights-discourse not just in the courts, but also in the street, 
where a more positive vision of a just society can be fought for.”). 
 301.  BLAU, supra note 8, at 175. 
 302.  WRIGHT, supra note 296, at 199, 266. 
 303.  Lynn M. Harter et al., The Structuring of Invisibility Among the Hidden Homeless: The 
Politics of Space, Stigma, and Identity Construction, 33 J. APPLIED COMM. RES. 305, 324 (2005). 
 304.  RICHARD H. ROPERS, THE INVISIBLE HOMELESS: A NEW URBAN ECOLOGY 199 (1988). 
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of their presence.”305  Like most forms of protest, visible poverty creates dis-
comfort because it challenges the status quo306; visible poverty as a form of 
protest challenges the American conscience to grapple with its own complic-
ity in creating the circumstances within which homelessness and poverty can 
thrive.307 
Current spatial-hierarchies not only undermine the viability of necessary 
protest, they also frustrate the possibility of proximity and the understanding 
that often comes with it.  Proximity is necessary to create social change.308  
Bryan Stevenson argues that the first thing we have to do to fight injustice is 
to get proximate to injustice; we must show up and see things with our own 
eyes.309  When we see injustice up close, Stevenson theorizes, we will have 
no choice but to act.310  Just as importantly, Stevenson reminds us that viable 
solutions can only be developed when one has an up-close view of a problem.  
Accordingly, as long as the influence of exile shapes American laws and pol-
icies, it negatively affects the prospects of social change and justice.311 
Perhaps the first step to really addressing homelessness is to examine 
ourselves, as well as our reactions to visible poverty. 
First, and fundamentally, we need to shift from the assumption that law 
enforcement and the criminal justice system are the most appropriate mech-
anisms for dealing with the use of public space by people experiencing home-
lessness.  Public attitudes toward visible poverty influence policymaking, law 
enforcement, and juridical decisionmaking.  Thus, connections between pub-
lic attitudes and laws that govern the allocation of rights in public space war-
rant particular attention.  Generally, laws, policies, and practices regulating 
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public space are not consciously created to punish visibly poor people for 
their status or condition.  However, this is often the impact. 
Common reactions to visible poverty—discomfort, unease, disgust, and 
anxiety—fuel the urge to exile.  Especially as gentrification accelerates in 
many urban centers, tensions over “appropriate” uses of public space also 
intensify.  A better understanding of common stereotypes relating to visible 
poverty may help citizens and policymakers to more carefully distinguish be-
tween dangerous or aggressive behavior or merely perceived danger, a typi-
cal consequence of witnessing someone who seems to be in desperate cir-
cumstances.  This reflection may also help us to better distinguish between 
social, economic, and health-related problems and criminal ones.  Laws and 
policies governing the regulation of public space should respond to evidence 
about crime and its consequences, not feelings of disgust over evidence of 
human desperation or difference. 
Currently, the law is too rigid with respect to the interpretation and un-
derstanding of popular attitudes toward visible poverty and how these per-
ceptions influence the development of the law.  For decades, various sciences 
have established understanding of in-groups and out-groups as a form of so-
cial control; the law needs to be more cognizant of these instincts in evaluat-
ing laws and policies that affect visibly poor and homeless people.  Under-
standing the influence of exile should prompt us to stop resorting to the use 
of the criminal justice system as a first response to visible poverty.  Confront-
ing the influence of exile can allow us to consider more effective and efficient 
responses that respect the rights of all people to exist in public space or, more 
fundamentally, to exist at all. 
